KEN KIRSCHENBAUM, ESQ ALARM - SECURITY INDUSTRY LEGAL EMAIL NEWSLETTER / THE ALARM EXCHANGE You can read all of our articles on our website. Having trouble getting our emails? Change your spam controls and whitelist ken@kirschenbaumesq.com ****************************** ADT burglary case offers lessons for alarm dealers Cellular backup no guarantee November 14, 2026 *************************** ADT burglary case offers lessons for alarm dealers Cellular backup no guarantee *************************** Cellular backup is not a guarantee: ADT burglary case offers lessons for alarm dealers An alarm system with cellular backup. Burglars who allegedly cut the power and destroyed the panel. No warning, according to the subscribers. A lawsuit seeking to hold the alarm company responsible for the resulting loss. If you think this is only ADT’s problem, think again. The allegations concern what many alarm dealers sell every day: backup communications and the expectation that someone will know when the system stops communicating. In Nguyen v. ADT LLC, the court granted part of ADT’s motion to dismiss and denied part. This was a pleading-stage decision, not a trial or a finding that ADT’s equipment or monitoring failed. Several claims were dismissed with permission to amend, and the court gave the plaintiffs until November 20, 2026 to file another complaint. Keep that distinction in mind throughout this discussion: the burglary account and claimed system deficiencies are allegations, not established facts. The homeowners entered into an ADT residential installation and monitoring contract in 2018. According to the complaint, the contract remained in effect when their Villa Park, California home was burglarized in February 2025. They alleged that the intruders cut electrical power, entered the home, and removed and destroyed the alarm panel. They further alleged that no alert or warning was provided concerning the power loss, lost cellular connection or offline panel, and that earlier notification would have reduced or prevented their losses. The feature at the center of the dispute was Safewatch CellGuard. The plaintiffs alleged that ADT represented it would provide continuous monitoring and immediately notify its monitoring center if the telephone line was cut or the property lost power. They also alleged that limitations involving destruction of the panel and the handling of communication-loss events had not been disclosed. Those allegations explain why this case involves more than a straightforward claim that an alarm failed to report a burglary: the subscribers were challenging what they said they had been promised about the backup feature itself. A backup communication path is not the same as immediate notice of its failure ADT’s currently available CellGuard materials describe cellular communication as an alternative when telephone or digital voice service is disrupted. Its support materials also identify dependence on an operating cellular device and network services. Those current materials provide useful background, but they do not establish what these subscribers saw, what their particular installation could do, or what was represented when they contracted or renewed. The court declined to take judicial notice of the archived marketing pages for purposes of deciding this motion, although it considered them as a basis for possible amended allegations. For the dealer, the important distinction is between having another way to transmit a signal and having a service that detects and reports a failure to communicate. Add to that the separate questions of backup power, panel operation, supervision intervals and the monitoring center’s response to a trouble condition. Do not assume that selling one feature answers all those questions. A representation that communications can continue during a telephone outage is not necessarily a promise that every power interruption, communication failure or destroyed panel will produce an immediate notification. Whether such a promise was actually made here remains disputed. Our October 21, 2026 discussion of cell-jamming detection made an important distinction: detection is not prevention. This case presents a related issue, but it is not a decision about cellular jamming. The order does not establish that a jammer was used, that CellGuard was a jamming detector, or that a jamming-detection device would have prevented the loss. The useful comparison is the danger of allowing a customer to confuse an added protective feature with a guarantee that communications cannot be defeated. DMP’s JamAlert materials, for example, describe a detector that can activate a panel zone or local notification equipment. Its dealer materials describe reporting to the monitoring center over a network connection when cellular jamming is detected. Detecting interference does not itself restore the affected cellular path or guarantee delivery of a signal. Before selling that service, identify how the detection will be communicated, what happens if that path is unavailable, and what the central station is expected to do. The device, the communication arrangement and the response service must be described accurately; the product name is not a substitute for that explanation. ADT did not seek dismissal of the breach-of-contract claim for failure to state a claim. It did seek to limit contract damages. The court dismissed the implied-warranty claim with leave to amend after discussing the contract’s warranty disclaimers and explaining that implied warranties generally do not attach to services. The fraud, negligent-misrepresentation and concealment claims were dismissed with leave to amend because the plaintiffs needed to plead the alleged misconduct with greater specificity. The declaratory-relief claim was also dismissed with leave to amend so the plaintiffs could clarify the contracts, provisions and rights they were challenging. The gross-negligence claim was dismissed with leave to amend because the plaintiffs had not identified a duty independent of the contract for the alleged negligent monitoring-center operations. Merely describing a contractual failure as gross negligence did not solve that pleading problem. The court denied dismissal of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act and Unfair Competition Law claims without prejudice to ADT raising its arguments again after amendment. It also rejected ADT’s limitations-period argument against the CLRA claim at this stage. None of that amounts to a finding that ADT committed fraud, gross negligence or a statutory violation. There is no need to speculate about whether ADT relied on its contract. The decision expressly states that ADT sought to limit damages under Paragraphs 5(C) and 5(D), and relied on warranty disclaimers in Paragraphs 5(B) and 13. The quoted contract language also allocated the risk of loss to the subscriber, disclaimed a guarantee that the equipment and services would prevent the specified events or their consequences, and included a release and promise not to sue. The order does not reproduce every protective provision or establish that each was separately asserted as a ground for dismissal. The homeowners challenged the damages provisions under California Civil Code § 1668 and public policy, and alleged unconscionability. Because they were being permitted to amend their fraud claims, the court denied ADT’s request to limit contract damages without prejudice to renewing it in response to the amended complaint. That is not a final ruling that the limitation provisions are unenforceable. It is equally wrong to report that the court enforced the damages cap in this decision. The issue remained open. The contract contained an arbitration clause and jury-trial waiver in Paragraph 7. The plaintiffs challenged those provisions insofar as they purported to waive a right to seek public injunctive relief under the California consumer statutes. Nevertheless, the motion addressed in this decision was a motion to dismiss, not a motion to compel arbitration. ADT did not avail itself of arbitration in the motion decided here. The order does not tell us why, whether a separate arbitration request was made elsewhere, or whether the right could still be asserted. It does not hold that ADT waived arbitration or that the arbitration provision was invalid. This is why the contract matters before the loss, not just after the lawsuit arrives. The Kirschenbaum Contracts™ include protective provisions addressing risk allocation, exculpation, limitations of liability and other aspects of the alarm relationship. Those provisions serve different purposes; an exculpatory clause is not the same thing as a damages limitation, and an arbitration clause addresses where and how a dispute is resolved rather than guaranteeing victory. The appropriate current agreement must also accurately identify the equipment and services being provided, including any separately offered jamming-detection service. Enforceability depends on the applicable law, the particular provision and the claim; no contract is a license to commit fraud or a promise of immunity from every claim. Do not undermine your agreement with a sales pitch that promises more than the system and service can deliver. Review proposals, website descriptions and sales representations along with the contract. Explain the distinction between an alarm signal and a supervisory or trouble condition, identify the communication and backup features actually supplied, and make sure the promised monitoring response matches the service arranged with the central station. Preserve the signed agreement, applicable renewals, service records and relevant representations so that the parties’ actual agreement can be established if a claim arises. The takeaway is not that cellular backup is useless or that this court struck down alarm-contract protections. Neither happened here. The takeaway is that an added feature can become the focus of a lawsuit when the subscriber’s understanding of its capabilities differs from the service actually undertaken. Sell the feature accurately, document the service, and use the appropriate Kirschenbaum Contracts™. A better detector or another communication path does not eliminate the need for a properly drafted and executed agreement. Here is the case: ************************* United States District Court, C.D. California. JAMES NGUYEN, et al. v. ADT LLC Case No. 8:26-cv-02143-KES Filed 10/26/2026 PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): Order GRANTING in part and DENYING in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 14) THE HONORABLE KAREN E. SCOTT, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE A. INTRODUCTION *1 In February 2026, Plaintiffs James and Jasmine Nguyen (“Plaintiffs”) filed this lawsuit against home alarm company ADT LLC (“Defendant” or “ADT”) in Orange County Superior Court alleging nine causes of action. (Dkt. 1-1.) After Defendant removed the case to federal court (Dkt. 1), Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC” at Dkt. 11). On October 1, 2026, Defendant moved to dismiss the FAC under Rule 12(b)(6). (Dkt. 14-1.) Plaintiffs filed an opposition (Dkt. 15) and a Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN” at Dkt. 16). Defendant replied. (Dkt. 17). For the reasons stated herein, the Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The hearing noticed for November 3, 2026, is ordered OFF CALENDAR. Plaintiffs may file a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) by November 20, 2026. B. SUMMARY OF THE FAC. 1. Factual Allegations. In February 2018, “Plaintiffs entered into a Residential Services Contract with ADT (in James Nguyen’s name) for the installation and monitoring of a home security system” at their home in Villa Park (the “Subject Property”). (FAC, ¶ 6.) The parties agree that Defendant filed an authentic copy of this alarm system/home monitoring contract (the “Contract”). (Dkt. 14-3; Dkt. 15 at 9.) The Contract was renewed at various points and was in effect when a burglary occurred at the Subject Property in February 2025. (FAC, ¶ 6.) “The intrusion began in the early morning hours when perpetrators cut the electrical power, forcibly entered the home, and physically removed and destroyed the ADT alarm panel.” (Id., ¶ 9.) ADT’s “Customer Monitoring Center failed to transmit a single alert, notification, or warning regarding the prolonged power loss, the severed cellular connection, or the offline panel.” (Id., ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs contend that a “timely power-loss, communication-loss, or intrusion notification would have enabled Plaintiffs, their designated contacts, and/or law enforcement to respond materially earlier, substantially reducing or preventing the prolonged intrusion and resulting losses. Instead, ADT’s failure resulted in the theft of highly valuable jewelry, cash, and personal property, as well as extensive damage to the real property.” (Id., ¶ 14.) Plaintiffs’ alarm system had a feature called “Safewatch CellGuard.” (FAC, ¶ 6.) “ADT represented that this feature would ensure continuous monitoring and immediately alert ADT’s Customer Monitoring Center if the physical telephone line were cut or if the Subject Property lost power.” (FAC, ¶ 7.) 2. Legal Claims. While this Order retains the numbering for the legal claims as stated in the FAC, it changes the sequence to group like claims together. Contract Claims No. 5 6 9 Fraud Claims 3 4 7 Tort Claims 1 Statutory Claims 2 8 Claim Breach of Contract Breach of Implied Warranty Declaratory Relief Fraudulent Misrepresentation Negligent Misrepresentation Fraud & Deceit (Concealment) Gross Negligence Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) at Civil Code § 1750 et seq. Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) at Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. Supporting Allegations “ADT materially breached the contract by failing to provide the monitoring and notification services required, specifically by failing to monitor, detect, and report the loss of power, loss of cellular communication, and the physical destruction of the system on February 26, 2025.” (FAC, ¶ 55.) The alarm system was unfit for its intended purpose because it “failed entirely to operate or transmit a signal when power and communication lines were severed.” (FAC, ¶ 61.) Defendant failed to perform services “in a workmanlike manner by systematically misconfiguring its monitoring center to ignore supervisory conditions and cellular drops.” (FAC, ¶ 62.) Defendant failed to provide monitoring services consistent with industry standards. (FAC, ¶ 62.) Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the Contract’s limitation-of-liability and liquidated damages provisions in Paragraph 5 are unenforceable. (FAC, ¶¶ 84, 86.) Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the Contract’s arbitration clause and jury trial waiver in Paragraph 7 are unenforceable “to the extent they purport to waive Plaintiffs’ statutory right to seek public injunctive relief” under the CLRA and UCL. (FAC, ¶ 85.) Defendant misrepresented “that the Safewatch CellGuard system would provide continuous monitoring and alert authorities even if the primary power or communication lines were cut or destroyed.” (FAC, ¶ 39.) These misrepresentations were made through Defendant’s “website, promotional brochures, and verbal statements” by sales representative Bennie Blanco. (FAC, ¶ 40.) Pled in the alternative to Claim 3. (FAC, ¶ 47.) Defendant had “exclusive technical knowledge regarding the programming, capabilities, and inherent limitations of the Safewatch CellGuard system.” (FAC, ¶ 65.) “ADT knew but intentionally concealed and suppressed the fact that: (a) the Safewatch CellGuard system could be easily defeated by violently destroying the physical control panel before an alarm was processed; and (b) ADT’s Customer Monitoring Center was systematically programmed or configured to ignore sudden losses of communication (such as a drop in cellular signal or power) rather than treating them as actionable alarm events. ADT intentionally omitted that its “backup” system fundamentally required the physical panel to survive the initial breach in order to function.” (FAC, ¶ 66.) Defendant had a common-law duty not to deceive Plaintiff about “known, critical vulnerabilities” in the alarm system. (FAC, ¶ 18.) Defendant “consciously and recklessly configured its Customer Monitoring Center and/or the Safewatch CellGuard system to ignore sudden communication drops, power losses, and panel destruction, effectively disabling the exact redundancy feature Plaintiffs were fraudulently induced into purchasing.” (FAC, ¶ 19.) Plaintiff, as consumers, purchased goods and services (i.e., security equipment and monitoring services) from Defendant. (FAC, ¶ 30.) Defendant marketed these goods and services using “unfair and deceptive” practices. (FAC, ¶ 32.) Defendant represented that the goods and services (a) had characteristics that they did not; (b) met particular standards of quality that they did not; and (c) involved rights or remedies that they did not, in violation of Civ. Code § 1770(a)(5), (7), and (14). (FAC, ¶ 32(a)-(c).) Defendant engaged in unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices. (FAC, ¶¶ 75-78.) Defendant “unconscionably rel[ies] on standard-form liability caps to escape financial responsibility for its own gross negligence and systemic failures.” (FAC, ¶ 78.) “ADT engaged in predatory sales tactics by inducing a non-resident family member, Edwin Tran, to sign a new two-year contract for the Subject Property.” (FAC, ¶ 73.) C. LEGAL STANDARD. A motion to dismiss shall be granted when the plaintiff’s allegations fail “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint may fail to state a claim for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In assessing whether a complaint states sufficient facts, courts consider whether it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation modified). Plausibility requires “more than mere labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do ....” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A plaintiff must plead factual content “that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. If a district court finds that a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, the court has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). District courts “should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Id. at 1127. D. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Plaintiffs ask the Court to take judicial notice of two documents: Exhibit 1: A true and correct copy of a webpage published by Defendant ADT LLC, titled “ADT CellGuard | Cellular Backup and Safewatch CellGuard Resources,” captured on January 24, 2022, and archived by the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine .... Exhibit 2: A true and correct copy of the same webpage published by Defendant ADT LLC, captured on December 30, 2022, and archived by the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine .... (Dkt. 16 at 1-2.) Plaintiffs ask the Court to take judicial notice of these documents “to establish what marketing representations Defendant ADT publicly presented to consumers regarding the ’Safewatch CellGuard’ system prior to and concurrently with the December 2022 contract renewal ....” (Id. at 2.) Defendant objects to the RJN as supplying new facts not in the FAC. (Dkt. 17 at 7-8.) The Court denies the RJN for purposes of ruling on the Motion to Dismiss but considers the webpage archives as a proffer of additional facts that Plaintiffs could allege if given leave to amend. E. DISCUSSION. 1. Claim 5: Breach of Contract. Defendant has not moved to dismiss Claim 5 for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. 14-1 at 8 (“While [Plaintiffs’] allegations may support a claim for breach of contract, they do not support the eight additional causes of action Plaintiffs have layered on top of it.”).) Defendant has moved to limit Plaintiffs’ contract damages under the Contract, Paragraphs 5(C) and (D). (Dkt. 14-1 at 36.) It is unclear if a motion to enforce a contract term to limit damages is properly brought under Rule 12(b)(6). Assuming it is, Defendant argues that although Jasmin Nguyen was not a signatory to the original Contract, her allegations that she is a third-party beneficiary mean that she is also bound by the Contract’s warranty disclaimers and limitations on liability. (Id. at 35-36.) Defendant argues that the disputed terms are not unconscionable, as a matter of law. (Id. at 35.) Plaintiffs, however, allege that those Contract paragraphs are unenforceable as contrary to “California Civil Code § 16681 and California public policy.” (FAC, ¶ 84.) Plaintiff also alleges that the Contract’s cap on liability is unconscionable. (FAC, ¶ 78.) Plaintiff argues that the “enforceability of Paragraph 5 depends on whether Plaintiffs’ fraud and concealment claims survive, and they do.” (Dkt. 15 at 20.) *3 Since the Court is granting Plaintiffs leave to amend their fraud claims, as described below, the Court denies Defendant’s motion as to Claim 5 without prejudice to Defendant renewing it in response to the SAC. 2. Claim 6: Breach of Implied Warranty. Defendant’s motion points to several Contract terms2 as waiving any implied warranties. First, Paragraph 5(B) provides as follows: B. NO GUARANTEE; NO LIABILITY. ADT’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kt. 14-3 at 5.) Paragraph 13 contains additional disclaimers, as follows: 13. NO OTHER WARRANTIES. OTHER THAN THE LIMITED WARRANTY PROVIDED UNDER THIS CONTRACT AND, IF PURCHASED, THE QSP, I AGREE THAT ADT MAKES NO GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, INCLUDING ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, WITH RESPECT TO THE SERVICES ADT PERFORMS OR THE EQUIPMENT IT PROVIDES. MY EXCLUSIVE WARRANTY REMEDY IS SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPHS 10, 11 AND 12 ABOVE. SOME STATES MAY NOT ALLOW THE PARTIES TO A CONTRACT TO LIMIT THE LENGTH OF AN IMPLIED WARRANTY. THE LAWS OF THE STATE WHERE THIS CONTRACT WAS SIGNED WILL DETERMINE WHETHER THESE LIMITATIONS AND EXCLUSIONS APPLY. (Id. at 6-7.) In their opposition, Plaintiffs do not argue that these provisions did not effectively disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose for their alarm system equipment. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that Claim 6 intended to allege that ADT had a duty to use “reasonable care in configuring its own monitoring center.” (Dkt. 15 at 19.) Plaintiffs argue that Claim 6 is about services, not “the merchantability of goods.” (Id.) That is not what the FAC says, and implied warranties generally do not attach to services. See Heidelberg USA, Inc. v. PM Lithographers, Inc., No. CV 17-02223-AB (AJWx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218428, at *30 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2017) (“The Installation Agreement between Heidelberg USA and Promedia is predominantly a service contract ... so it contains no implied warranties, see Cal. Com. Code §§ 2314-2315.”). For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss Claim 6, but with leave to amend. 3. Claim 9: Declaratory Relief. *4 Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ challenges to the enforceability of the various Contract terms are necessarily subsumed by their other claims. (Dkt. 14-1.) Plaintiffs argue that their “equitable-relief allegations rest on ADT’s continued marketing of CellGuard and on its post-burglary sale of the same CellGuard technology into Plaintiffs’ home through a new account in a family member’s name.” (Dkt. 15 at 22.) Defendants have not demonstrated that Plaintiffs have no viable claim for declaratory relief. Plaintiffs’ claims, however, are unclear. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). Claim 9 is therefore dismissed with leave to amend. In their SAC, Plaintiffs must (1) clearly state which claims are based on the Contract and/or renewals of the Contract; (2) which claims are based on the alleged “new account in a family member’s name”; and (3) which claims (if any) are based on both. If, for example, Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration that some terms in the “new account” contract are unenforceable, then Plaintiffs must identify those terms and allege facts as to why they are unenforceable. Additionally, Plaintiffs must allege facts showing why they have standing to bring claims over (1) the new contract to which they are not parties and/or (2) marketing statements made in the course of marketing the new contract that were not directed at them. Plaintiffs are encouraged to attach to the SAC a copy of all contract documents on which any contract claims rely. 4. Claims 3, 4, and 7: Fraud Claims. Rule 9(b) requires that the circumstances constituting fraud be alleged with particularity. Specifically, “[t]o satisfy Rule 9(b), a pleading must identify ’the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged,’ as well as what is false or misleading about the purportedly fraudulent statement, and why it is false.” Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). Plaintiffs apparently base some claims on the webpages attached to the RJN. It is unclear how these webpages related to the original Contract or subsequent renewals. The Court, therefore, grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on Rule 9(b) with leave to amend to add facts related to these webpages, the “sales brochures” referenced in the FAC, the statements by Bennie Blanco, and the who, what, when, where, and how of all the misrepresentations on which Plaintiffs’ claims rely. To the extent Plaintiffs intend to bring a fraud-in-the-inducement claim, the SAC must clearly identify the fraud that allegedly induced them to enter the Contract and/or renew the Contract. 5. Claim 1: Gross Negligence. Under California law, a person may not ordinarily recover in tort for the breach of duties that merely restate contractual obligations. Rather, “conduct amounting to a breach of contract becomes tortious only when it also violates a duty independent of the contract arising from principles of tort law.” Erlich v. Menezes, 21 Cal. 4th 543, 551 (1999) (disallowing emotional distress damages as a remedy for breach of contract that caused economic loss). Defendant moves to dismiss based on the economic loss rule. (Dkt. 14-1 at 27-28.) Plaintiffs argue, “Breach of contract becomes tortious when it also violates a duty independent of the contract arising from principles of tort law. Fraud is that kind of independent duty.” (Dkt. 15 at 17 (citation omitted).) Even if this is true, it does not support asserting a negligence claim that is not a fraud claim. If the only “gross negligence” alleged is the same fraud already alleged in Plaintiffs’ fraud-based claims, then it is unclear what Claim 1 adds. To the extent the FAC alleges that ADT negligently ran its customer monitoring center, Plaintiffs have not identified any duty ADT owed to them outside of the Contract. For these reasons, Claim 1 is dismissed with leave to amend. 6. Claims 2 and 8: CLRA and UCL. *5 Defendant claims that Plaintiffs’ CLRA claim is untimely under the three-year statute of limitations. (Dkt. 14-1 at 20.) Plaintiffs contend that their CLRA claim did not accrue until they discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, the falsity of ADT’s representations, which they allege was on February 26, 2025. (FAC, ¶ 12; Dkt. 15 at 15.) ADT argues that Plaintiffs could have discovered the alleged deception years earlier because they had a document (i.e., the Contract) in their possession that, if examined, would have revealed the cause of action. (Dkt. 14-1 at 20-21.) Plaintiffs counter, “[N]o document revealed that ADT’s monitoring center was configured to ignore loss-of-communication events. Whether a ’may not receive’ warning put a reasonable customer on notice of that undisclosed configuration, especially while ADT was marketing the backup as working during power outages, is a fact question.” (Dkt. 15 at 15-16.) Defendant has failed to show that Plaintiffs’ CLRA claim is untimely at the pleading stage. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not alleged facts showing causation. “Even if ADT had described Safewatch CellGuard exactly as Plaintiffs say it should have, the same criminals would have cut the same power and destroyed the same alarm panel.” (Dkt 14-1.) But Plaintiffs allege they would not have purchased an ADT alarm system had they known then what they know now and instead would have “retained a competent security provider.” (FAC, ¶ 34.) The remaining challenges to the CLRA and UCL claims are premised on the failure of Plaintiffs’ fraud claims. Since the Court has granted Plaintiffs leave to amend their fraud claims, the Court denies Defendant’s’ motion to dismiss Claims 2 and 8 without prejudice to Defendant raising the same arguments in response to the SAC. Initials of Deputy Clerk jd All Citations Slip Copy, 2026 WL 3212948 Footnotes 1 Section 1668 provides, “All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law..” 2 Contract Paragraph 12 addresses when ADT’s repair warranty applies. (See Dkt. 14-3 at 6; Dkt. 15 at 19-20.) End of Document © 2026 Thomson Reuters. 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