KEN KIRSCHENBAUM, ESQ
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Johnson Control wins wrongful termination lawsuit
August 24, 2026
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Johnson Control wins wrongful termination lawsuit – tech hired to do field work accommodation does not include office work
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As an employer you know how hard it is to find good help; finding them and getting them to agree to work for you. But even harder than that, terminating an employee’s employment, especially if that employee falls within one or more of the classifications that qualify for the anti-discrimination laws, such as race, religion, disability and age. K&K provides Employment Agreements and Handbooks, but these, though essential, do not really address when you can terminate a “classified” employee without risking a discrimination lawsuit. K&K gets calls often with that issue, and the answer is usually it’s very fact sensitive and when terminating a classified employee great care needs to be taken; legal guidance is a good idea, before you “pull the plug”, not after the water is down the drain.
Johnson Control employed a tech who was primarily employed to perform installations; hands on field work. It’s employee became disabled which was beyond refute. After 18 months Johnson Control notified the employee that he was discharged; the employee insisted on “accommodations” and claimed he was able to provide in office support, answering the phone, training, etc. Johnson Control did not have any openings for those positions and stuck by its decision to terminate employment.
The former employee sued, claiming discrimination and wrongful discharge, arguing that no effort was made for accommodation. The judge did a good job of explaining what accommodation would amount to and found that even with accommodation the former employee would not be able to perform the field work he was hired to do. It’s noted that no other jobs he may have been able to do were open.
The case is worth reading; it’s below. K&K has an Employment Law Department. Concierge Clients get “quick phone call advice”, a free half hour consult each month and discounted fees for the contracts and forms and billed legal services. You want to avoid being named as a defendant in any lawsuit; employment law claims can be particularly challenging and may not be covered by any insurance you carry; check with your insurance broker.
Case No. 8:25-cv-01846-FWS-DFM
Filed 08/10/2026
PROCEEDINGS: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [29]
HONORABLE FRED W. SLAUGHTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
*1 In this action, Plaintiff Rene Hernandez pleads claims against Defendant Johnson Controls Security Solutions, LLC related to the allegedly wrongful termination of Plaintiff's employment and Defendant's labor code violations. (See generally Dkt. 6-1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”).) Before the court is Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Dkt. 29-1 (“Motion” or “Mot.”).) Plaintiff opposes the Motion. (Dkt. 30 (“Opp.”).) Defendant filed a reply in support of the Motion. (Dkt. 35 (“Reply”).) The parties' positions regarding undisputed facts are set forth in Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Genuine Disputes of Material Fact.1 (Dkt. 36 (“SGD”).) The court held a hearing on the Motion on August 6, 2026. (Dkt. 39.) Based on the state of the record, as applied to the applicable law, the Motion is GRANTED.
I. Background
From approximately 2008 to 2024, Plaintiff worked at Defendant as a security installer. (SGD ¶ 1.) Plaintiff testified that, as a security installer, “Plaintiff would install fire and security monitoring systems in new construction and existing buildings.” (Id. ¶ 11.)
Plaintiff's testimony included the following. “[A]t the end of December 2021, [Plaintiff] was scheduled to take a two-week vacation and return to work January 10, 2022, but was unable to return to work due to COVID complications.” (Id. ¶ 37.) Plaintiff “experienced symptoms such as severe shortness of breath, chronic fatigue, cognitive decline, headaches, [and] chills.” (Id. ¶ 39.) Plaintiff “sought treatment for his COVID symptoms,” (id. ¶ 40), and applied for short-term disability and long-term disability, (id. ¶¶ 41-42). Plaintiff “kept human resources informed of his leave, including short-term and long-term disability.” (Id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff “worked with Lincoln Financial Group to apply for short-term and long-term disability.” (Id. ¶ 44.) “[W]hen the short-term disability expired, [Plaintiff] transitioned to long-term disability.” (Id. ¶ 45.) Plaintiff “was qualified for long-term disability benefits because a physician certified he was unable to work due to COVID complications.” (Id. ¶ 46.)
Plaintiff provided the following testimony. Plaintiff “received a letter via mail dated November 3, 2023, stating that his employment would terminate on December 28, 2023, unless he returned to work with or without an accommodation, because he reached the duration of his 18 months on long-term disability according to the Health & Welfare Summary Plan Document.” (Id. ¶ 47.) Plaintiff “was informed by [Defendant's] employee that he would need a doctor's release to return to work.” (Id. ¶ 48.) Plaintiff “provided [Defendant] with a letter dated December 15, 2023, containing light-duty restrictions.” (Id. ¶ 49.) “Dr. Kwong stated Plaintiff could return to work on December 28, 2023, with light-duty work with breaks.” (Id. ¶ 50.) Plaintiff “filled out a physical/mental demands form with Steven Moreno,” (id. ¶ 51), who he had reported to for about seven to eight years, (id. ¶ 13), and Plaintiff “agreed with all the selections on the physical/mental demands form,” (id. ¶ 52).
Plaintiff also provided the following testimony. Plaintiff “returned to work on December 28, 2023, and December 29, 2023.” (Id. ¶ 54.) On those two days, Plaintiff assisted another security installer with troubleshooting a fire alarm. (Id. ¶ 55.) Plaintiff “did not perform any physical installations December 28, 2023, and December 29, 2023.” (Id. ¶ 56.) Plaintiff “worked with another security installer on January 3, 2024, again.” (Id. ¶ 57.) That day, Plaintiff “was informed by [ ] Moreno to go home until further notice.” (Id. ¶ 58.)
“On January 4, 2024, Christine Worrell [(‘Worrell’)] sent Plaintiff an email requesting that he complete [the] ADA paperwork with his treating physician before returning to work.” (Id. ¶ 59.) Plaintiff's “physician filled out the ADA paperwork,” (id. ¶ 60), which suggested light duty or desk work,” (id. ¶ 62).
Then, on February 16, 2024, “Worrell emailed a termination letter with attachments to [ ] Plaintiff at his personal Gmail email address.” (Id. ¶ 64.) Plaintiff states that his employment was terminated over the phone and no light duty was offered. (Dkt. 29-5 (Deposition of Plaintiff, “Plaintiff Dep.”) 128:5-20.)
Further, Plaintiff provided the following testimony. “[O]n October 15, 202[4], [Plaintiff] shared with his doctor that he has problems with sleeping, bathing, dressing, self-grooming, walking, performing hobbies, climbing stairs, shopping, cooking, performing housework, and driving.” (SGD ¶ 75.) Plaintiff “still suffers from many of his previous complaints, including eye pain, dizziness, and balance issues.” (Id. ¶ 76.) “[S]ince October 2024, none of [Plaintiff's] symptoms have gotten better.” (Id. ¶ 77.) Plaintiff's “numerous complaints and symptoms have remained the same from December 2021/January 2022 to the present.” (Id. ¶ 78.) Plaintiff “has not made any efforts to find new employment since his termination from [Defendant].” (Id. ¶ 79.)
Plaintiff states that he does not know of any particular job he could perform given his physical limitations and subjective complaints and symptoms he is suffering to date from COVID. (Plaintiff Dep. 164:1-16.) Plaintiff also states that he thinks he could do light duty but probably not hard installation work. (Id. 120:1-14.) Plaintiff agreed that it was fair to say, with his limitations, he “could not perform the installation job duties, the actual physical manual labor of pulling a wire, installing the equipment that was required of an installer.” (Id. 127:4-11.) Plaintiff states that he assumes “light duty stuff” could have been provided such as programming, customer training, and service calls. (Id. 126:8-17.)
In this case, in summary, Plaintiff alleges Defendant discriminated against him based on his disability and his age; retaliated against him for taking leave; failed to accommodate his disability and engage in a good faith interactive process; and also that Defendant committed various California Labor Code violations.
II. Legal Standard
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue of fact is “genuine” only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is “material” if it may affect the outcome of the case, and the “substantive law [ ] identif[ies] which facts are material.” Id. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id.
*3 The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying the elements of the claim or defense on which summary judgment is sought and evidence that it believes demonstrates the absence of an issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the non-moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, the movant can satisfy its initial burden by demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Id. at 325; see also Horphag Rsch. Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The moving party bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.”).
Nevertheless, “inferences are not drawn out of thin air, but from evidence.” Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1247 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987). “[M]ere disagreement or the bald assertion that a genuine issue of material fact exists” does not preclude summary judgment. Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728, 731 (9th Cir. 1989). “[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (internal quotation marks omitted). “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 247-48; see also United States v. Fred A. Arnold, Inc., 573 F.2d 605, 606 (9th Cir. 1978) (“A summary judgment cannot be granted if a genuine issue as to any material fact exists.”).
In In re Oracle Corp., the Ninth Circuit described the burdens of proof in the summary judgment process:
The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Where the moving party meets that burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial. This burden is not a light one. The non-moving party must show more than the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence. The non-moving party must do more than show there is some “metaphysical doubt” as to the material facts at issue. In fact, the non-moving party must come forth with evidence from which a jury could reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving party's favor. In determining whether a jury could reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving party's favor, all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor.
III. Analysis
In the Complaint, Plaintiff pleads claims against Defendant for (A) discrimination, (B) retaliation, (C) failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation, (D) retaliation in violation of the California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”), (E) failure to accommodate, (F) failure to engage in a good faith interactive process, (G) declaratory judgment, (H) wrongful termination in violation of public policy, (I) failure to pay wages, (J) failure to indemnify necessary business expenses, (K) failure to provide meal and rest periods, (L) failure to provide itemized wage and hour statements, (M) waiting time penalties, and (N) unfair competition (“UCL”), (Compl. ¶¶ 40-154, 160-63), and Plaintiff also seeks (O) punitive damages, (id. at 31).2 Defendant moves for summary judgment on each claim and the requested relief. (See generally Mot.) The court addresses each claim and the requested relief in turn.
A. Discrimination Claims
The California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee “in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of an employee's physical disability or age. Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(a). The court addresses in turn Plaintiff's (1) disability discrimination claim and (2) age discrimination claim.
1. Disability Discrimination Claim
“To establish a prima facie disability discrimination case under FEHA, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, that she was a ‘qualified individual’ who ‘could perform the essential [functions] of the job with or without reasonable accommodations.’ ” Wright v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 609 F. App'x 918, 919 (9th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Wills v. Superior Ct., 195 Cal. App. 4th 143, 159-60 (2011)). “ ‘Essential functions’ means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. ‘Essential functions’ does not include the marginal functions of the position.” Cal. Gov't Code § 12926(f); see also Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 11065(e) (defining essential and marginal functions). “Determining the essential functions of a position requires ‘[a] highly fact-specific inquiry.’ ” Wright, 609 F. App'x at 919 (quoting Cripe v. City of San Jose, 261 F.3d 877, 888 n.12 (9th Cir. 2001)).
*5 Defendant argues “it is undisputed that Plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of the [s]ecurity [i]nstaller role from the time of his alleged disability in December 2021 until his employment was terminated.” (Mot. at 15.) Defendant further argues that “Plaintiff cannot show that any reasonable accommodation existed that would have enabled him to perform the essential functions” of a security installer. (Id. at 16.) “Plaintiff disputes Defendant's contention that he could not perform the essential functions of the [s]ecurity [i]nstaller [t]echnician position.” (Opp. at 8.) Plaintiff responds that “Plaintiff's position lists more duties beyond the physical installation of devices,” which Plaintiff could perform, and that a jury must determine whether any job function is essential. (Id.)
The court finds Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue as to whether he was a qualified individual who could perform the essential functions of a security installer without accommodation. See Wills, 195 Cal. App. 4th at 159-60. The job description for a security installer is described as follows:
What you will do
Installing low voltage systems which includes the installation of cable, conduit, peripheral devices which can include panel repair and reprogram, device replacement/repair, resolving low voltage circuit troubles and system testing. Organize and effectively utilize technical resources, information, material, and support to assure efficient execution of all assigned tasks.
(Dkt. 32-3 at 5.) Plaintiff's ADA Form, which Moreno completed with Plaintiff's input, describes the “DETAILS OF PHYSICAL ACTIVITIES” of Plaintiff's job as follows: “[p]ulling cable from point A to B, using ladders, mounting devices, some scissor lift work.” (Dkt. 29-5 (“Plaintiff's ADA Form”) at 236; see also Plaintiff Dep. 96:18-97:6 (Plaintiff confirming this description as accurate of the physical activities of an installer).) Plaintiff testified his physician filled out ADA paperwork stating that Plaintiff was unable to perform manual tasks such as carrying or installing equipment, lifting above his head, or working outdoors for more than 15 minutes at a time and that Plaintiff is limited to light duty. (SGD ¶ 60; Dkt. 29-5 at 228-29.) Plaintiff agreed that it was fair to say, with his limitations, he “could not perform the installation job duties, the actual physical manual labor of pulling a wire, installing the equipment that was required of an installer.” (Plaintiff Dep. 127:4-11.) In addition, Plaintiff has stated that he does not know of any particular job he could perform given his physical limitations and the subjective complaints and symptoms he is suffering to date from COVID. (Id. 164:1-16.) Based on this undisputed record, the court finds that Plaintiff cannot perform the essential functions of a security installer without accommodation because Plaintiff's documented and admitted limitations prevent him from performing the essential installation tasks. See Ceja-Corona, 664 F. App'x at 650 (“Ceja-Corona cannot demonstrate that a reasonable accommodation was available. ... She has admitted that she could not perform the responsibilities of the position that she last held, or of the other positions that she had held.”).
The court further finds that Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue as to whether he was a qualified individual who could perform the essential functions of a security installer with a reasonable accommodation. See Braunling, 220 F.3d at 1157. Plaintiff relies on several asserted facts to demonstrate a reasonable accommodation was possible. (See Opp. at 8.)
First, Plaintiff states that, on January 3, 2024, Plaintiff was assigned to install a burglar alarm system and was physically able to perform the installation, citing Plaintiff's deposition testimony as support. (See SGD ¶ 93 (citing Dkt. 32-1 (Deposition of Plaintiff 2, “Plaintiff Dep. 2”) 106:23-107:5).) However, as Defendant points out, the deposition testimony cited by Plaintiff does not support this asserted fact. (See SGD ¶ 93.) Rather, Plaintiff merely testifies that he did his “best at installing and moving along” on January 3rd. (Plaintiff Dep. 2 106:23-107:5.)
*6 Second, Plaintiff states that installation technicians regularly performed “reactivations” which did not require technicians to climb, citing to Moreno's deposition testimony. (See SGD ¶¶ 98-99 (citing Dkt. 29-7 (Deposition of Steven Moreno, “Moreno Dep.”) 23:21-25:2).) However, according to the cited testimony by Moreno, these reactivations were “a small portion” of the work, happening two to four times a month. (Moreno Dep. 23:21-24:7.) Moreno also confirmed that, even if Moreno could only give Plaintiff reactivations, it would not be something he could do full-time in Moreno's region. (Id. 24:19-23.) Based on this testimony, the court is not persuaded that an accommodation of only reactivation work “seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases” because the reactivation work is a small portion of installation work and it is not something Plaintiff could do full-time. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401 (citing Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 259 (1st Cir. 2001) (plaintiff meets burden on reasonableness by showing that, “at least on the face of things,” the accommodation will be feasible for the employer)). Plaintiff fails to present evidence that Defendant could feasibly alter the security installer position such that Plaintiff could only do reactivations.
Third, Plaintiff states that heard other coworkers were on light duty in which they worked on repair and customer service issues. (Plaintiff Dep. 2 128:21-129:16, 129:24-130:9, 130:16-20.) Plaintiff further states that Defendant could have provided light duty work such as programming, customer training, and service calls. (Plaintiff Dep. 126:8-17.) The court finds such statements insufficient to raise a triable issue as to whether reassignment to a vacant position was possible. See, e.g., Ceja-Corona, 664 F. App'x at 650 (“Ceja-Corona cannot demonstrate that a reasonable accommodation was available. She has also failed to point to any specific vacant position to which she could have been reassigned.”). Plaintiff merely relies on observations that his coworkers have performed different tasks than him, rather than presenting evidence of a specific vacant position that he could have been reassigned to. See id. Furthermore, Plaintiff has stated that he does not know of any particular job he could perform given his physical limitations and the subjective complaints and symptoms he is suffering to date from COVID. (Plaintiff Dep. 164:1-16.) Moreover, “Moreno considered various jobs encompassed in his scope of his region for [ ] Plaintiff to be reassigned but there were no open positions where Plaintiff could work.” (SGD ¶ 84.) Additionally, the court notes Plaintiff testified that he “does not recall any harassment with respect to any disability or medical issue,” (id. ¶ 6), and he “never complained to anyone at [Defendant] that he was mistreated or treated differently because of his disability or medical condition,” (id. ¶ 10). Plaintiff also states that security installers were permitted to volunteer to perform on-call repair technician work which Plaintiff was eligible to perform, citing to Moreno's deposition testimony. (See SGD ¶ 101 (citing Moreno Dep. 48:16-49:23).) However, Plaintiff fails to present evidence that a vacant repair technician job existed or that he was qualified to do repair technician work in light of his significant physical limitations. For all of these reasons, the Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's disability discrimination claim.
2. Age Discrimination Claim
“To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, [Plaintiff] must show he was ‘(1) at least forty years old, (2) performing his job satisfactorily, (3) discharged, and (4) either replaced by substantially younger employees with equal or inferior qualifications or discharged under circumstances otherwise giving rise to an inference of discrimination.’ ” Merrick v. Hilton Worldwide, Inc., 867 F.3d 1139, 1146 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Schechner v. KPIX–TV, 686 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2012)).
Defendant argues that the age discrimination claim fails because there is no evidence to support an unlawful animus. (Mot. at 18.) Plaintiff responds that a “reasonable jury may infer discriminatory motive from Defendant's actions and the surrounding circumstances.” (Opp. at 11.)
*7 The court finds that Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue as to whether Plaintiff's discharge was under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See Merrick, 867 F.3d at 1146. Plaintiff does not point to specific circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination. (See Opp. at 10-12.) Rather, Plaintiff relies on conclusory assertions of Defendant's alleged misconduct. (See id. at 11 (“Here, Plaintiff relies on evidence that Defendant failed to reasonably accommodate his disability, failed to engage in the interactive process in good faith, and ultimately terminated his employment after decades of service while failing to meaningfully consider available accommodations or reassignment opportunities.”).) Plaintiff relies on Moreno's statement that there was a “big move across the company to hire more installers” in 2022 or 2023 while Plaintiff was on leave. (See id.; Moreno Dep. 67:10-13.) The court finds Moreno's statement insufficient to raise a triable issue because it does not demonstrate Plaintiff was discriminated against based on age but reflects Defendant's hiring objectives. Furthermore, the undisputed record reflects that Plaintiff never felt like he was being harassed or picked on because of his age and that Plaintiff never complained to anyone at Defendant about being mistreated based on his age. (SGD ¶¶ 5, 9.) Plaintiff also testified that “he has ‘no idea’ if any employee replaced him.” (Id. ¶ 68.) In sum, the court finds Plaintiff has not presented any evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff was “either replaced by substantially younger employees with equal or inferior qualifications or discharged under circumstances otherwise giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Merrick, 867 F.3d at 1146 (citation modified). Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's age discrimination claim.
B. Retaliation Claim
“It is unlawful for an employer to ‘discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because the person has opposed any practices forbidden under this part or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this part.’ ” Bailey v. San Francisco Dist. Attorney's Off., 16 Cal. 5th 611, 636 (2024) (quoting Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(h)). “This type of unlawful employment practice is known simply as ‘retaliation.’ ” Id. (citing Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1042 (2005)). “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under FEHA, an employee must show that (1) she engaged in a ‘protected activity,’ (2) the employer subjected her to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer's action.” Id. (citing Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th at 1042).
In evaluating FEHA claims for retaliation and discrimination, courts use the three-stage burden shifting test set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973). If the plaintiff presents a prima facie case, a presumption of retaliation or discrimination arises. Merrick, 867 F.3d at 1145. Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer must offer a legitimate, nonretaliatory, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. at 1145-46. If the employer meets this burden, the presumption of retaliation or discrimination disappears. Id. at 1146. “[T]he plaintiff must raise a triable issue suggesting that the employer's proffered reason is mere pretext for unlawful [retaliation or] discrimination, or offer other evidence of [retaliatory or] discriminatory motive.” Id. The ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of retaliation or discrimination “remains with the plaintiff.” Id.
The parties do not dispute whether Plaintiff can establish the prima facie case for retaliation but dispute whether Defendant produced a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action. Accordingly, the court assumes that Plaintiff established the prima facie case for retaliation for purposes of the court's analysis. Defendant argues that it “produce[d] a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action—i.e., that Plaintiff was not qualified to perform any open positions with or without accommodation—the burden shifts back to the [Plaintiff] to prove intentional retaliation.” (Mot. at 19.) Defendant further argues “there is no evidence that a retaliatory animus motivated the termination decision.” (Id.) Plaintiff responds that a “reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant's decision to terminate Plaintiff was motivated by his disability-related leave and his request for accommodation.” (Opp. at 13.)
FEHA's Section 12940(a) prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee “in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of an employee's physical disability. Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(a). Though, Section 12940(a)(1) also provides as follows:
*8 This part does not prohibit an employer from refusing to hire or discharging an employee with a physical or mental disability, or subject an employer to any legal liability resulting from the refusal to employ or the discharge of an employee with a physical or mental disability, if the employee, because of a physical or mental disability, is unable to perform the employee's essential duties even with reasonable accommodations, or cannot perform those duties in a manner that would not endanger the employee's health or safety or the health or safety of others even with reasonable accommodations.
The court finds Defendant adequately demonstrates that Plaintiff was terminated for a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason.3 See Merrick, 867 F.3d at 1145-46. As discussed above, see Section III.A.1, supra, the job description, Plaintiff's ADA form, Plaintiff's physician statement, and Plaintiff's own statements reflect Plaintiff's inability to perform the essential duties of a security installer with or without accommodations. Again, “Moreno considered various jobs encompassed in his scope of his region for [ ] Plaintiff to be reassigned but there were no open positions where Plaintiff could work.” (SGD ¶ 84.) Based on this record, the court finds Plaintiff's inability to perform the essential duties of a security installer with or without accommodations, in conjunction with Moreno's search for available positions, sufficient to demonstrate Plaintiff was terminated for a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason. See, e.g., Calderon, 2022 WL 3012180, at *14 (“In sum, [d]efendants have met their burden of providing a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action—[p]laintiff's inability to perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation.”); Ceja-Corona, 664 F. App'x at 651 (“Assuming without deciding that Ceja-Corona made out a prima facie case of retaliation, CVS offered a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for terminating Ceja-Corona: no reasonable accommodation existed. Ceja-Corona then bore the burden to establish intentional retaliation or to show that CVS' reason was pretextual.”) Because Defendant has met its burden, the presumption of retaliation disappears, and Plaintiff must raise a triable issue suggesting Defendant's proffered reason is mere pretext for unlawful retaliation. See Merrick, 867 F.3d at 1146.
The court finds that Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue suggesting Defendant's reason is pretext for retaliation against Plaintiff for engaging in protected activities. See id. As Defendant points out, Plaintiff “fails to offer any evidence to show that [Defendant]'s legitimate reason for his termination was pretextual.” (Reply at 13); see Calderon v. Bio-Med. Applications of Mission Hills, Inc., 2023 WL 4234233, at *1 (9th Cir. June 28, 2023) (“The circumstantial evidence of retaliation that Calderon presented was insufficient to demonstrate that Defendants' legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action—that Calderon was terminated because she was unable to perform the essential functions of her position—was pretextual.”). Plaintiff argues that a “reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant's decision to terminate Plaintiff was motivated by his disability-related leave and his request for accommodation.” (Opp. at 13.) The court finds no reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant's decision to terminate Plaintiff was motivated by retaliation for Plaintiff's leave and request for accommodation; Plaintiff presents no evidence supporting this theory, and indeed, Plaintiff's employment was terminated over two years after he went on leave and there is no evidence that additional leave would enable him to return to work and be able to perform his job with or without reasonable accommodations. (SGD ¶¶ 37, 41-42, 64); see Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A nearly 18–month lapse between protected activity and an adverse employment action is simply too long, by itself, to give rise to an inference of causation.”); Tipton v. Airport Terminal Servs., Inc., 2020 WL 3980127, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2020) (“[A]n employer is not required to provide an indefinite leave of absence.”); McCarthy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 819 F. Supp. 2d 923, 936 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (“Employers need not retain an employee on the payroll on an indefinite leave of absence when that employee is unable to work.”). Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's retaliation claim.
C. Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Retaliation Claim
*9 “Where ... a plaintiff cannot establish a claim for discrimination, the employer as a matter of law cannot be held responsible for failing to prevent same: [T]here's no logic that says an employee who has not been discriminated against can sue an employer for not preventing discrimination that didn't happen ....” Featherstone v. S. California Permanente Med. Grp., 10 Cal. App. 5th 1150, 1166 (2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Defendant argues that the failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation claim fails because Plaintiff cannot prove actionable discrimination or retaliation. (Mot. at 20.) Plaintiff responds that the discrimination and retaliation claims do not fail. (Opp. at 13.) Because Plaintiff fails to establish actionable discrimination and retaliation claims, the court finds that Plaintiff fails to adequately establish the failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation claim. See Featherstone, 10 Cal. App. 5th at 1166 (“Because Featherstone cannot establish her underlying cause of action for disability discrimination, she cannot maintain a derivative claim for violation of section 12940, subdivision (k).”); see also, e.g., Mankaruse v. Raytheon Co., 793 F. App'x 630, 631 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Because Mankaruse did not establish a prima facie case for discrimination, the district court properly granted summary judgment on Mankaruse's failure to prevent discrimination claim.”). Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation claim.
D. The California Family Rights Act Claim
To establish a CFRA retaliation or discrimination claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate the following: “(1) the defendant was an employer covered by CFRA; (2) the plaintiff was an employee eligible to take CFRA leave; (3) the plaintiff exercised her right to take leave for a qualifying CFRA purpose; and (4) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, fine, or suspension, because of her exercise of her right to CFRA leave.” Faust v. California Portland Cement Co., 150 Cal. App. 4th 864, 885 (2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Defendant argues “Plaintiff has no evidence to refute the legitimate basis for termination or suggest that any distant CFRA leave caused the termination.” (Mot. at 20.) Plaintiff responds that “Plaintiff has presented evidence creating a triable issue of fact that, after he exercised his leave rights and sought to return to work with medical restrictions, Defendant unilaterally concluded that he could not be accommodated, failed to conduct a meaningful search for vacant positions or otherwise explore reasonable accommodations, and terminated his employment.” (Opp. at 14.)
The court finds that Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue as to whether he was terminated due to him exercising his right to CFRA leave. As discussed above, see Section III.B, supra, Defendant adequately demonstrates that Plaintiff was terminated for a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason being Plaintiff's inability to perform the essential duties of a security installer, rather than taking a medical leave. The court is not persuaded that Plaintiff's leave creates a triable issue as to whether he was terminated for exercising his right to CFRA leave given the large temporal gap between termination and the protected activity. See Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1065 (“A nearly 18–month lapse between protected activity and an adverse employment action is simply too long, by itself, to give rise to an inference of causation.”). Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's CFRA claim.
E. Failure to Accommodate Claim
*10 “The elements of a failure to accommodate claim are (1) the plaintiff has a disability under the FEHA, (2) the plaintiff is qualified to perform the essential functions of the position, and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff's disability.” Scotch v. Art Inst. of California, 173 Cal. App. 4th 986, 1009-10 (2009). “For purposes of an alleged failure reasonably to accommodate a disability, a plaintiff proves he or she is a qualified individual by establishing that he or she can perform the essential functions of the position to which reassignment is sought, rather than the essential functions of the existing position.” Cuiellette v. City of Los Angeles, 194 Cal. App. 4th 757, 767 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendant argues that “Plaintiff's physical limitations (which continue to this day) prevented him from performing the essential functions of any job, with or without reasonable accommodation.” (Mot. at 21.) Defendant further argues that “additional leave was not reasonable” and that “a permanent light duty position was not a reasonable accommodation and was not available.” (Id. at 22.) Plaintiff responds that “Plaintiff has already demonstrated how he was a qualified individual because he could have performed his installer position or any other position for Defendant with or without accommodation.” (Opp. at 15.) For the reasons discussed above, see Section III.A.1, supra, the court finds Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue as to whether he was a qualified individual who could perform the essential functions of the job he had or purportedly sought. Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's failure to accommodate claim.
F. Failure to Engage in a Good Faith Interactive Process Claim
“The FEHA prohibits an employer from failing ‘to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee ... to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee ... with a known physical or mental disability.’ ” Miller v. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 105 Cal. App. 5th 261, 282 (2024) (alterations in original) (quoting Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(n)). “[A]n employer cannot be held liable for failure to engage in the interactive process where the employee is unable to identify a reasonable accommodation that would have been available had the parties engaged in the interactive process.” Id. at 282-83.
Defendant argues that “there was no reasonable accommodation that would permit Plaintiff to work in his position or any other position at [Defendant].” (Mot. at 23.) Plaintiff responds that “Plaintiff has presented evidence that modifications to his installer position were possible and had been utilized for installers in the past.” (Opp. at 17.)
The court finds Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue as to whether there was a reasonable accommodation available at the time the interactive process should have occurred. See Miller, 105 Cal. App. 5th at 282. As discussed above, see Section III.A.1, supra, Plaintiff fails to present evidence demonstrating the existence of a reasonable accommodation. (See generally Dkt.) Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's failure to engage in a good faith interactive process claim.
G. Declaratory Judgment Claim
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim “fails because it is derivative of Plaintiff's failed FEHA claims.” (Mot. at 23.) Plaintiff responds that the discrimination and retaliation claims do not fail. (Opp. at 17.) Because Plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim is based on the failed FEHA claims, the Motion is GRANTED as to the declaratory judgment claim. Paleny v. Fireplace Prods. U.S., Inc., 103 Cal. App. 5th 199, 213 (2024) (“Similarly, because each of appellant's causes of action for harassment, discrimination, and retaliation fail as a matter of law, appellant's dependent cause of action for declaratory relief likewise fails.”).
H. Wrongful Termination Claim
*11 Defendant argues that Plaintiff's wrongful termination claim fails because the FEHA claims fail. (Mot. at 24.) Plaintiff responds that the FEHA and CFRA claims do not fail. (Opp. at 18.) Because Plaintiff's wrongful termination claim is based on failed claims, the Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's wrongful termination claim. See Dep't of Fair Emp. & Hous. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 642 F.3d 728, 748 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming district court holding that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to Carauddo's wrongful termination claim because DFEH could not prevail on any of its claims under the FEHA); Sneddon v. ABF Freight Sys., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1131 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (“Defendant correctly contends that if the claim for age discrimination fails, plaintiff's cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy fails because it is derivative of plaintiff's statutory claim under Government Code § 12940.”).
I. Failure to Pay Wages Claim
“Plaintiff testified that his failure to pay wages claim is based on ‘lack of breaks where we [security installers] knew we had to get the job done and we just rushed right through it.’ ” (SGD ¶ 69.)
Defendant argues Plaintiff's failure to pay wages claim fails because “Plaintiff cannot present any evidence that Defendant had knowledge of any alleged off-the-clock work, including any work during the allegedly missed meal or rest periods.” (Mot. at 25.) Plaintiff responds “Plaintiff has presented evidence that, in practice, Defendant maintained an implied workplace policy or expectation that completing assigned jobs within the prescribed time took priority over taking legally required meal and rest breaks.” (Opp. at 18.)
The California Supreme Court has held, “that employees are clocked out creates a presumption they are doing no work, a presumption [plaintiffs] have the burden to rebut.” Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Ct., 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1051 (2012). “[L]iability is contingent on proof [defendant] knew or should have known off-the-clock work was occurring.” Id. “While an employer's actual or constructive knowledge of the hours its employees work is an issue of fact, the court on summary judgment must determine whether evidence has been presented that would support a finding of such knowledge.” Cleveland v. Groceryworks.com, LLC, 200 F. Supp. 3d 924, 938 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Jong v. Kaiser Health Found., Inc., 226 Cal. App. 4th 391, 399, (2014)). “Testimony that is conclusory or speculative in nature that is presented in the moving papers is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (citing White v. Starbucks Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083-85 (N.D. Cal. 2007)).
The court finds that Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue as to whether Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of off-clock work. See Brinke, 53 Cal. 4th at 1051. Plaintiff relies on his deposition testimony in which he states that he had to finish the job and that he thinks it was more implied that breaks were secondary. (Plaintiff Dep. 56:12-57:7, 57:18-21.) The court finds such testimony insufficient to raise a triable issue because Plaintiff merely speculates that breaks were secondary and that he had to prioritize work such that he could not take breaks. See Cleveland, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 938. Furthermore, Plaintiff's testimony does not demonstrate Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge that Plaintiff could not take breaks. Rather, Plaintiff's testimony reflects Plaintiff's own understanding that breaks were secondary.
Moreover, the undisputed record reflects that Plaintiff knew he could take breaks, that Defendant did not stop him from taking breaks, and that Plaintiff has acknowledged in his timecards he received his breaks. First, “Plaintiff understood he was entitled to take meal and rest breaks.” (SGD ¶ 74.) “Plaintiff testified he understood he was entitled to a 30-minute lunch period,” (id. ¶ 19), and stated that he “tried to adhere to” the 30-minute lunch period, (Plaintiff Dep. 47:25-48:3). Second, Plaintiff stated that he does not recall anyone telling him to skip a rest period, that no one has told him his breaks were secondary, that he never complained to anyone about the nature of the job requiring him to miss a meal period, and that he never complained to anyone about being forced to skip or miss a rest break. (Id. 56:12-57:7, 59:1-10.) Plaintiff also testified that “Moreno never told Plaintiff to skip a rest break or meal break.” (SGD ¶ 34.) Third, “Plaintiff testified that he would certify the hours worked on his timecards each week and ensured they were complete and accurate to the best of his ability.” (Id. ¶ 25.) “Plaintiff testified that when he certified his timecards, he acknowledged the language that states ‘I have received all of my meal and rest periods for this pay period.’ ” (Id. ¶ 27.) “Plaintiff testified that [Defendant] and his manager relied on Plaintiff to report his time correctly.” (Id. ¶ 28.) “Plaintiff testified he could not recall making a mistake in recording his own time, he understood he could have informed his supervisor of any such issues.” (Id. ¶ 29.) “Plaintiff testified he recorded his hours accurately.” (Id. ¶ 30.)
*12 For these reasons, the Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's failure to pay wages claim.
J. Failure to Indemnify Necessary Business Expenses Claim
California Labor Code Section 2802(a) provides that “[a]n employer shall indemnify his or her employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties, or of his or her obedience to the directions of the employer, even though unlawful, unless the employee, at the time of obeying the directions, believed them to be unlawful.” Cal. Lab. Code § 2802(a).
“ ‘[B]efore an employer's duty to reimburse is triggered, it must either know or have reason to know that the employee has incurred an expense. Once the employer has such knowledge, then it has the duty to exercise due diligence and take any and all reasonable steps to ensure that the employee is paid for the expense.’ ” Wilson v. The La Jolla Grp., 61 Cal. App. 5th 897, 919 (2021) (quoting Stuart v. RadioShack Corp., 641 F. Supp. 2d 901, 904 (N.D. Cal. 2009)). “California courts have inferred a knowledge requirement under the statutory provision because an employer cannot reimburse an expense it does not know about.” Potts v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 2024 WL 1328191, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 28, 2024).
Defendant argues “Plaintiff cannot present evidence that Defendant failed to reimburse any known, reasonable, and necessary expenses that he incurred in the discharge of his duties.” (Mot. at 26.) Plaintiff responds that one of Defendant's supervisors “knew that [Plaintiff] had trouble submitting reimbursement request forms and that he was not getting reimbursed as a result” and that “[t]his knowledge by a supervisor must be imputed to Defendant.” (Opp. at 19.)
The court finds that Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue as to whether Defendant knew or had reason to know Plaintiff incurred the claimed expenses. See Wilson, 61 Cal. App. 5th at 919. To demonstrate Defendant's knowledge, Plaintiff relies on Plaintiff's deposition testimony in which he states that Moreno gave him tips to submit reimbursement requests. (Plaintiff Dep. 2 154:20-155:7.) The court finds such testimony insufficient because Plaintiff's statements that Moreno gave him tips on how to submit reimbursement requests does not demonstrate that Moreno or Defendant knew about Plaintiff's claimed expenses, particularly where Plaintiff does not present evidence that he submitted the unclaimed expenses requests to Moreno or Defendant. See Potts, 2024 WL 1328191, at *2 (“There is no genuine of dispute of material fact that Sirius lacked actual or constructive knowledge of Potts's claimed expenses. Potts never made a reimbursement request before leaving Sirius.”). Even if such statements demonstrate Defendant had some knowledge that Plaintiff might be incurring expenses, the court finds Defendant exercised due diligence by having an established procedure to submit expense reimbursement requests. (Plaintiff Dep. 147:13-19 (Plaintiff confirming there was a process to seek reimbursements for business expenses)); see Potts, 2024 WL 1328191, at *2 (“In addition, even if Sirius's reimbursement policies and work-from-home directive demonstrate some knowledge that Potts might be incurring some expenses during the pandemic, Sirius exercised due diligence by taking reasonable steps to ensure that Potts was paid for any such expenses by maintaining reimbursement policies and asking Potts to submit any outstanding reimbursement requests before she left the company.”). Moreover, Plaintiff testified that “Moreno's Card was on file at Walters Wholesale Electronics to get supplies,” which could be an alternative means to covering expenses. (SGD ¶ 73.) Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to the failure to indemnify necessary business expenses claim.
K. Failure to Provide Meal and Rest Periods Claim
*13 Under California law, “[a]n employer generally must provide a 30-minute meal period to all nonexempt employees who work more than five hours, and a second 30-minute meal period to employees who work more than 10 hours.” Lampe v. Queen of the Valley Med. Ctr., 19 Cal. App. 5th 832, 847 (2018) (citations omitted); Cal. Labor Code § 512. In addition, employers “shall not require an employee to work during a meal or rest or recovery period” required by the wage orders of the Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”). Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7(b); see, e.g., IWC Wage Order No. 4-2001 § 12 (setting out rest periods applicable to professional, technical, clerical, mechanical, and similar occupations). Though, “the employer is not obligated to police meal breaks and ensure no work thereafter is performed.” Brinker, 53 Cal. 4th at 1040.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's failure to provide meal and rest periods claim fails because Plaintiff was provided reasonable opportunities to take compliant meal and rest breaks. (Mot. at 26-27.) Plaintiff responds “Plaintiff has presented evidence that, in practice, Defendant maintained an implied workplace policy or expectation that completing assigned jobs within the prescribed time took priority over taking legally required meal and rest breaks.” (Opp. at 18.)
For the reasons discussed above, see Section III.I, supra, the court finds that Plaintiff fails to raise a triable as to whether Defendant provided Plaintiff with reasonable opportunities to take meal and rest breaks. Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's failure to provide meal and rest periods claim.
L. Failure to Provide Itemized Wage and Hour Statements Claim
California Labor Code Section 226(a) requires employers to provide employees with “an accurate itemized statement in writing” showing, inter alia, “gross wages earned,” “all deductions,” “net wages,” and “all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee.” Cal. Lab. Code § 226(a). Itemized wage statement violations are governed by a one-year statute of limitations. Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc., 40 Cal. 4th 1094, 1118 n.16 (2007).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's wage and hour statements claim is barred by the statute of limitations. (Mot. at 27.) Plaintiff responds that this claim does not fail because the claim is derivative of surviving Labor Code violation claims. (Opp. at 20.)
The court finds that Plaintiff's wage and hour statements claim is barred by the statute of limitations. See Murphy, 40 Cal. 4th at 1118 n.16. Plaintiff's termination was effective February 16, 2024, (see Dkt. 29-5 at 247 (Termination Letter)), and Plaintiff's last wage statement for his last day worked was issued on January 12, 2024, (Dkt. 29-13 at 139 (wage statement)). The Complaint was filed on June 30, 2025, which is well over a year after the two prior events. (See Compl.) Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to the wage and hour statements claim.
M. Waiting Time Penalties Claim
Under California Labor Code Section 203, if “an employer willfully fails to pay,” in accordance with Sections 201, 202, or 205, “any wages of an employee who is discharged or who quits, the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action therefor is commenced; but the wages shall not continue for more than 30 days.” Cal. Lab. Code § 203(a).
Defendant argues that “Plaintiff was not owed any unpaid wages (or any other amounts) at the time he was terminated.” (Mot. at 28.) Plaintiff responds that this claim does not fail because the claim is derivative of surviving Labor Code violation claims. (Opp. at 20.) Because the waiting time penalties claim is based on the failed Labor Code violation claims, the Motion is GRANTED as to the waiting time penalties claim.
N. Unfair Competition Claim
*14 Defendant argues that, “[b]ecause Defendant is entitled to judgment on Plaintiff's other claims, Plaintiff's derivative claim for violation of the UCL fails as a matter of law.” (Mot. at 28-29.) Plaintiff responds that this claim does not fail because the claim is derivative of surviving claims. (Opp. at 20.) Because the UCL claim is based on the failed claims, the Motion is GRANTED as to the UCL claim.
O. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are recoverable when a plaintiff proves “by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294; see Commodore Home Sys., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. 3d 211, 221 (1982) (confirming that this standard applies in FEHA cases). Because corporations are legal entities without “minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive,” punitive damages awards against them “rest on the malice of [their] employees.” Cruz v. HomeBase, 83 Cal. App. 4th 160, 167 (2000). “But the law does not impute every employee's malice to the corporation,” only “corporate leaders” “whose intentions guide corporate conduct,” specifically “officers, directors, or managing agents.” Id. (citation modified); see Yeager v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 944 F. Supp. 2d 913, 931 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“[T]he evidence must demonstrate an officer, director or managing agent of [d]efendant committed, authorized or ratified an act of malice, oppression or fraud to create a genuine issue of material fact on punitive damages.”). A “managing agent” is one “who exercises substantial independent authority and judgment in their corporate decisionmaking so that their decisions ultimately determine corporate policy.” White v. Ultramar, Inc., 21 Cal. 4th 563, 566-67 (1999); Cruz, 83 Cal. App. 4th at 167-68 (stating that a managing agent is a person “with substantial authority over decisions that set” the “general principles which guide a corporation, or rules intended to be followed consistently over time in corporate operations”). Whether a person is a managing agent “turns not on the employee's managerial classification or title, but on the extent of his decisionmaking discretion.” White, 21 Cal. 4th at 580. In this regard, “[e]ach case must be decided on its facts.” Id.
Defendant argues “there is no evidence that any officer, director, or managing agent committed an act of fraud, oppression, or malice toward Plaintiff.” (Mot. at 30.) Plaintiff responds that “a jury could find Defendant's conduct sufficiently oppressive or malicious based on its failure to meaningfully engage in the interactive process, its unilateral determination that Plaintiff could not be accommodated, its failure to conduct a documented search for available positions, and its decision to terminate Plaintiff after a lengthy medical leave without fully evaluating reasonable alternatives.” (Opp. at 20.) Plaintiff further responds that “Worrell and [ ] Moreno made the substantive decisions that Plaintiff could not be accommodated, that no alternative accommodation was identified, and that Plaintiff's employment would proceed toward termination.” (Id. at 21.)
The court finds that Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue as to whether Defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3294. First, Plaintiff fails to provide evidence that Moreno or Worrell were officers, directors, or managing agents for purposes of Section 3294. (See generally Opp.) Rather, the undisputed record reflects that Worrell was a human resources manager, (SGD ¶ 88), and Moreno was an operations manager, (id. ¶ 81), which are not positions falling under Section 3294. See, e.g., Roby v. McKesson Corp., 47 Cal. 4th 686, 714-15 (2009), as modified (Feb. 10, 2010) (individual supervising four employees at a local distribution center was not a managing agent for purposes of punitive damages under Section 3294). Second, Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue as Plaintiff's claims for reasons discussed above. Third, even if Plaintiff adequately demonstrated a triable issue as to whether Plaintiff was wrongfully terminated, “wrongful termination, without more, will not sustain a finding of malice or oppression.” Scott v. Phoenix Schs., Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 702, 717 (2009). For these reasons, the Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's request for punitive damages.
IV. Disposition
*15 For the reasons stated above, the Motion is GRANTED. The only remaining claim in this case is Plaintiff's failure to permit inspection of personnel and payroll records claim.
The court observes that the deadline for the parties to complete a settlement conference is August 20, 2026. (See Dkt. 27 (Scheduling Order).) The court ORDERS the parties to meet and confer regarding how the failure to permit inspection of personnel and payroll records claim should proceed. The court further ORDERS the parties to file a status report regarding the outcome of the settlement conference, and the parties' discussions regarding how the failure to permit inspection of personnel and payroll records claim should proceed on or before August 21, 2026.
If the parties fail to resolve this claim in their settlement conference and meet-and-confer, the court ORDERS the parties to show cause in writing on or before August 27, 2026, why the court should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (providing that where “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” it “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over” remaining state law claims); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 & n.7 (1988) (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of [the relevant factors of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity] will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”); Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./W., 289 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding district court did not abuse discretion in dismissing state-law claims where court granted summary judgment on federal claims).
All Citations
Slip Copy, 2026 WL 2326613
Footnotes
The court determines what constitutes an undisputed fact based on the underlying evidence, the parties' submitted statements of facts, and their responses and objections thereto. See AFMS LLC v. United Parcel Serv. Co., 105 F. Supp. 3d 1061, 1071 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (“In deciding the motions for summary judgment, the [c]ourt examines the underlying evidence, not the summary statements or ... compound paragraphs offered in the parties' statements of undisputed facts.”) (citation omitted), aff'd 696 F. App'x 293 (9th Cir. 2017); see (Dkt. 33 (Plaintiff's Evidentiary Objections).)
All citations refer to the CM/ECF pagination. The court notes that Plaintiff's claim for failure to permit inspection of personnel and payroll records is not subject to the Motion. (See generally Mot.)
Although the court grants summary judgment as to the discrimination claims on other grounds, the court notes that Defendant's reason for terminating Plaintiff is also a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. See Merrick, 867 F.3d at 1145-46.
End of Document
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