Amazon had no duty to intervene in medical alert situation in its warehouse June 24, 2026

KEN KIRSCHENBAUM, ESQ
ALARM - SECURITY INDUSTRY LEGAL EMAIL NEWSLETTER / THE ALARM EXCHANGE
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Amazon had no duty to intervene in medical alert situation in its warehouse 
June 24,  2026
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Amazon had no duty to intervene in medical alert situation in its warehouse
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    It seems like a long time ago I reported on a case where I squarely agreed with the Judge's decision and outcome.  Here's one from a federal court sitting in Louisiana.  I'll only briefly review it because I think you should read the decision, though a lot of legal issues are discussed, mostly related to the issue of "duty".  When I first saw the case I thought it would have a different outcome, one that you could use to discourage your subscriber from self monitoring their security systems.
    Amazon engaged a subcontractor to do some work in its warehouse, which had no other people around at the time.  Amazon did have a security system that protected doors and signals were send to on-site personnel who were supposed to be monitoring 24/4.  The subcontractor had a medical incident, was alone, seizures with a lot of threshing on the floor; he hit a door and the alarm activated but the security guards were not on their post.  The subcontractor was not discovered for a half hour, having suffered serious injury.  Amazon had an internal policy of monitoring anyone in its warehouse and after some time decided to do it electronically rather than with guards accompanying the people working in the warehouse.  The subcontractor contended that Amazon has a duty, by policy and as land owner, to monitoring and protect him, which Amazon failed to when its guards abandoned their post for a half hour.
    Amazon took a chance and moved to dismiss based on lack of duty, a necessary element to prove any of the subcontractor's theories of liability.  
    The Judge went through the various theories of liability presented by the subcontractor and found, in each instance, no legal duty.  Read the below decision; it's worth your time and it's applicable in all states.  I don't think the decision would have been any different if a professional monitoring center was sued for failing to dispatch on the medical alert under these same circumstances.  One difference, your E&O carrier is not likely to engage Amazon's caliber of attorney who understands the duty issue.  Maybe you can guide them, or tell your carrier to engage K&K.
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United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana.
TRAVIS AGUILLARD
v.
AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC et al.,
CIVIL ACTION 3:25-670-SDD-SDJ
05/29/2026
RULING
CHIEF JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
*1 This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim1 filed by Defendant Amazon.com Services, LLC (“Amazon” or “Defendant”). Plaintiff, Travis Augillard2 (“Augillard” or “Plaintiff”) filed an Opposition,3 to which Defendant filed a Reply.4 After careful consideration of the parties' arguments and applicable law, the Court finds that the Defendant's Motion shall be GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case arises from personal injuries Plaintiff suffered following a medical episode he experienced while working at Defendant's warehouse in Port Allen, Louisiana (“the Warehouse”). On or about August 10, 2024, Plaintiff, a maintenance technician employed by non-party Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc. (“Jones Lang”), was assigned to perform maintenance services at the Warehouse. While doing so, Plaintiff suddenly lost consciousness and began convulsing on the floor. Although he was alone at the time, Plaintiff's fall managed to engage a door security alarm. Defendant's managers and safety personnel, however, were absent from their assigned positions, leading to a delay in discovering Plaintiff's medical emergency and efforts to render aid. As a result, Plaintiff's convulsion went unattended for nearly half an hour, during which time he repeatedly struck his head and back, causing severe bodily injury.
On October 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in Louisiana state court, alleging negligence and negligence per se against Defendants Amazon and Universal Protection Service, LLC (“Universal”) (collectively “Defendants”). Defendants removed to this Court, asserting federal diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).5 Amazon thereafter filed its first Motion to Dismiss6 on November 12, 2025 (the “December 2025 Motion”). Plaintiff responded by filing an Amended Complaint, alleging Amazon is liable under theories of negligence, negligent undertaking, vicarious liability, and premises liability.7 Amazon subsequently filed the instant Motion to Dismiss,8 causing the Court to deny the December 2025 Motion as moot.9
With this background in mind, the Court turns its attention to the motion before it.
II. LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he ‘court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’ ”10 The Court may consider “the complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”11 “To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ”12 In Twombly, the United States Supreme Court set forth the basic criteria necessary for a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”13 A complaint is also insufficient if it merely “tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ”14 However, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads the factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”15 In order to satisfy the plausibility standard, the plaintiff must show “more than a sheer possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully.”16 “Furthermore, while the court must accept well-pleaded facts as true, it will not ‘strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff.’ ”17 On a motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”18
B. Negligence and Premises Liability
While negligence19 and premises liability20 are distinct causes of action under Louisiana law, “liability for both tort claims is determined by applying the duty/risk analysis.”21 As such, the result under either “should be the same.”22 The duty/risk analysis requires a plaintiff to prove five elements: “(1) the defendant had a duty to conform his or her conduct to a specific standard of care (the duty element); (2) the defendant failed to conform his or her conduct to the appropriate standard (the breach of duty element); (3) the defendant's substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries (the cause-in-fact element); (4) the defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (the scope of liability [ ] element); and, (5) actual damages (the damages element).”23 Each element of the duty/risk analysis is dispositive, in that, if any one element is not present, liability cannot result.24
The duty element is the crux of this motion, and the parties vigorously dispute what duty, if any, Amazon owed Plaintiff. The absence of a duty entirely negates a cause of action for negligence.25 Plaintiff argues that Amazon owed him a duty to act reasonably in its provision of safety and security supervision at the Warehouse.26 He relies on Miller v. McDonald's Corporation27 for the proposition that “a proprietor of a business establishment has an ordinary duty of care to render reasonable aid under the circumstances after he knows or has reason to know that a person on his premises is ill or injured.”28 Moreover, Plaintiff contends the following allegations29 are sufficient (in any event) to impose a duty of reasonable care on Amazon:
• Amazon controlled the premises upon which he was injured, and he arrived there for Amazon's benefit;
• Amazon's safety representatives were required by policy to accompany and monitor workers such as [Plaintiff] on its premises;
• Amazon managers were required by internal safety policies to be present in [Plaintiff's] work area, but were absent at the time of his injury;
• [Plaintiff] had previously repeatedly complained about Amazon's failure to follow its own safety policies and procedures, to no avail;
• Amazon installed safety alarms on its premises, and employed/controlled the individuals charged with monitoring them;
• Amazon employees knew or should have known of [Plaintiff's] emergency when he triggered the emergency alarm but disregarded it.
Amazon, on the other hand, maintains that “Plaintiff's entire amended complaint depends on conflating ‘safety and security’ with emergency medical assistance.”30 In its view, Plaintiff asks this Court to do what no other has done: find “a duty of a warehouse owner to monitor, 24/7, every inch of a warehouse that is not open to the public, for emergency medical situations that may befall independent contractors, and to promptly render medical assistance.”31
Whether a legal duty exists is a question of law the Court must determine as a threshold matter.32 The focal inquiry asks if a plaintiff has any law—statutory, jurisprudential, or arising from general principles of fault—to support his claim that the defendant owed him a duty.33 This inquiry must also account for “the facts and circumstances of the case and the relationship of the parties.”34 In any event, “[t]he scope of a duty may not encompass the risk encountered where the circumstances of the injury cannot reasonably be foreseen or anticipated, because in that instance[,] there is no ease of association between the risk of injury and the duty.”35 The parties do not cite, nor did the Court find, any specific statutory provision governing a warehouse owner's liability for failing to monitor for, and promptly respond to, non-work related medical emergencies experienced by independent contractors on its premises. The Court must therefore consider whether Plaintiff's cited case law or an independent general rule or principle of law confers an applicable duty of care.
*3 At the core of this dispute is Plaintiff's contention that, while he was working as a contractor at Amazon's facility, he was struck by an unexpected medical episode and suffered injuries, the extent of which may have been mitigated if several of Amazon's internal policies—none of which concern the detection or treatment of medical emergencies on their face—had been followed.36 As an initial matter, “[i]t is widely recognized in the field of tort law that [ ] courts do not impose a general duty to come to the aid of one who is in peril[;] that is, one will not be held legally liable for his inaction even though his assistance could have saved the injured party.”37 Absent a duty to provide such assistance, it follows that one would have no duty to investigate for opportunities where it may need to do so. However, “there is a legally recognized duty to render assistance in situations where the plaintiff's peril or injury is due to negligence on the part of the defendant or in situations where [the defendant] begins rescue and thereby discourages others from aiding the injured party.”38 An additional exception to the general no-rescue rule applies when a special relationship exists between the parties.39 As discussed below, Plaintiff does not fit either of these exceptions neatly.
First, there is no suggestion that Plaintiff's sudden medical emergency was, in any way, caused by Amazon, or that Amazon's actions discouraged others from rendering aid to Plaintiff. Plaintiff's injury was the result of an organic circumstance, not any act by Amazon. Thus, a duty to rescue did not arise in this manner.
The second exception—asking for a special relationship between the parties—is also unavailing. Plaintiff relies upon Miller v. McDonald's Corporation;40 this case deals with an alleged “refusal to assist and/or refusal to render first aid after defendants knew or should have known that plaintiff had been [injured].”41 The decision, however, clearly implicates the relationship between a shopkeeper (McDonalds Corporation) and its patron.42 This is not the relationship between Plaintiff and Amazon, an independent contractor and its contractee. Notably, in Turnage v. General Electric Company, a district court applying Louisiana law considered the duty set forth by Miller and refused to extend its reach to a plaintiff-contractor who sought to hold a contractee liable in tort for negligently failing to swiftly evacuate him from an offshore rigging platform after he sustained injuries thereon.43 The court recognized that while “proprietors and property owners have duties of care to ordinary invitees ... [Plaintiff] is no ordinary invitee: he is an independent contractor.”44 Accordingly, the Turnage court concluded the contractee had no legal obligation to provide the contractor a medical evacuation following his injury, describing any help that was, in fact, provided to be mere assistance rather than the fulfillment of a duty.45 The Fifth Circuit agreed, finding “no genuine issue of material fact remain[ed] to indicate that [the defendant] owed a duty to transport [plaintiff] to a medical facility for treatment of his burns.”46
*4 Central to the district court's reasoning was the principle from Ainsworth v. Shell Offshore, Inc.,47 that a defendant contractee who does not exercise or retain operational control over a plaintiff-contractor's work has no duty to intervene therewith, even if it has knowledge of a hazardous condition. Importantly, the court clarified that a different outcome was not required simply because the contractee's representative was present to monitor the contractor's progress and, accordingly, performed periodic inspections—this did not equal “the exercise of operational control” sufficient to create a special relationship.48 Here, the fact that Plaintiff was often left alone to perform his work at the Amazon facility, coupled with the absence of any allegations suggesting the manner of his work was directed (in any way) by Amazon, suggests his circumstances are significantly analogous to the plaintiff in Turnage, and therefore inviting of a similar outcome. Indeed, the present circumstances are even less hospitable to the notion of a contractee having a relationship-based duty to provide medical assistance to an injured contractor because, unlike in Turnage, Plaintiff's injury was not sustained as a result of work being performed for the contractee's benefit or by the conditions of the contractee's facility.49
To the extent the defendant-contractee in Turnage had no duty to provide (or even summons) immediate medical transport for an injured contractor, Amazon cannot be found, by way of that same relationship, to have had a duty to inspect a contractor's workstation to ensure he was not in medical distress following the activation of a door alarm. Although Louisiana courts have long-recognized that “there may be a strong moral and humanitarian obligation” to inspect such alarms on the chance that someone may be experiencing an emergency requiring “aid and assistance,” there is no legal responsibility to do so.50 In the absence of such a duty-creating relationship, the general rule that no affirmative duty exists to care for another in medical distress applies to Amazon.
Plaintiff's attempt to couch any such duty owed into Amazon's more general “duty to act reasonably in its provision of safety and security supervision,” likewise, cannot succeed.51 While the duty of a landowner to provide for the safety of its invitees is recognized in Louisiana jurisprudence,52 Amazon is correct that Plaintiff conflates the duty to provide “safety” on the premises with providing timely “emergency medical assistance.”53 Indeed, Amazon's duty to Plaintiff was one of “not exposing [him] to unreasonable risks of injury or harm ... given the nature of facility and the dangers presented by it ... given [his] age, maturity, experience, familiarity with the premises[,] and its dangers.”54 Thus, the Court concludes that any landowner/invitee duty inquiry must ask whether the mechanism of injury was internal to the premises or to the Plaintiff (i.e., a physical condition that created a foreseeable risk of harm or a personal medical condition). In the latter instance, as relevant here, there will often be no duty for a landowner to have taken steps to detect or mitigate the harm that might arise from the condition—this flows logically from the well-settled principle that, “in the usual case, there is no obligation to protect the invitee against dangers which are known to him,” personally.55 This applies with heightened force where the danger, which is personal to the invitee, is otherwise unknown to the landowner.56
*5 Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts to establish that Amazon owed any legal duty to inspect door alarms or take comparative steps to ensure his medical emergency was detected sooner.
C. Negligent Undertaking
Amazon next takes aim at Plaintiff's claim that he has plausibly alleged a claim for negligent undertaking. To succeed under a theory of negligent undertaking, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) undertakes to render services, (2) to another, (3) which the defendant should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person.57 Importantly, “an affirmative or positive undertaking is required.”58 In deciding whether this standard is satisfied, the Court considers “the scope of the defendant's involvement, the extent of defendant's authority, and defendant's underlying intent.”59 Plaintiff alleges the following facts60 are sufficient to show Amazon voluntarily assumed (or undertook) a duty to provide for his protection and safety:
• Amazon undertook to employ security personnel, install emergency alarms, and install employees/agents to monitor those alarms;
• Amazon undertook to accompany and monitor third party contractors working on its premises by implementing policies requiring a safety representative to do so;
• Amazon did so in order to provide a safe working environment for individuals such as Mr. Augillard;
• Amazon did so knowing that the services undertaken were necessary for the safety of individuals like Mr. Augillard;
• Given that he was alone at the time of his injury, Mr. Augillard and his employer apparently relied on Amazon's undertaking to provide these supervision and monitoring services.
Applying the above-stated principles, however, Plaintiff has failed to make the necessary showing. First, Plaintiff cites no authority to support the proposition that the installation and subsequent monitoring of door alarms is sufficient to create a legal duty to promptly investigate for possible medical emergencies (or any other possible cause) each time one is triggered.61 The same is true of implementing general policies aimed at supervising independent contractors working on the premises.62 But Plaintiff alleges, on information and belief, that Amazon took these actions “to provide a safe working environment for individuals such as Mr. Augillard ... recogniz[ing] the necessity of alarms to prevent harm to invitees”—and that a duty to do so arose accordingly.63
*6 As an initial matter, “conclusory allegations and unwarranted deductions of fact are not [to be] admitted as true” for purposes of a motion to dismiss and will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.64 Importantly, Plaintiff alleges no facts to suggest that Amazon's intent in installing the alarms or implementing the relevant policies was to anticipate and respond to non-work-related medical emergencies suffered by independent contractors on the premises. While Plaintiff is entitled to have reasonable inferences drawn in his favor, the inferences drawn “must be rational and reasonable, not idle, speculative, or conjectural.”65 At most, Plaintiff's allegations allow the Court to infer that the safety of independent contractors, generally, was a possible consideration in installing door alarms and requiring their supervision—such measures naturally touch upon safety concerns. Even so, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts for the Court to conclude Amazon's contemplated safety considerations extended beyond preventing harm from facility-related hazards to include detecting or responding to personal medical conditions. Further, even if Plaintiff had alleged such facts, he cannot establish that the concern was of such magnitude, and the resultant actions so inspired by that concern, that a duty was assumed; “mere concern or minimal contact about safety matters are not sufficient to constitute an assumption of duty.”66
Moreover, the Court notes that Plaintiff's alleged reliance67 on Amazon monitoring and supervising his activities at the Warehouse did not create an enforceable legal duty for same or result in its assumption of the same. Indeed, unilateral expectations are not a proper source of legal duties.68 To conclude otherwise would invite an untenable proposition: a defendant's failure to outline its specific intent in adopting a policy or implementing security measures at its facility would expose it to liability for every possible harm a Plaintiff would expect those actions to protect against. Nothing in Louisiana law suggests a duty can be so easily assumed.
For the above reasons, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently state a claim against Amazon for negligent undertaking.
D. Vicarious Liability
Finally, Plaintiff contends that, in addition to his claims against Amazon for its own negligence, Amazon is also vicariously liable for its employee's negligence.69 Under Louisiana law, “an employer is liable for its employee's torts committed if, at the time, the employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment.”70 While Plaintiff does not single out the acts of any one employee, a fair reading of the Complaint identifies those managers and personnel who were absent from their assigned positions—“which led to a failure to identify the emergency or timely render aid”—as the likely source of Plaintiff's respondeat superior theory.71 Moreover, Plaintiff correctly points that Amazon does not directly challenge this cause of action in its motion to dismiss.72
*7 Nevertheless, there can be no imposition of vicarious liability where it is not alleged that the conduct of an employee is either wrongful or independently actionable.73 As discussed above, the only actions implicating an Amazon employee are the alleged failures to monitor or promptly inspect the alarm system and to follow the relevant contractor supervision policies. But Plaintiff does not allege that any of Amazon's employees owed him a duty of care independent of the duties Amazon allegedly owed him as an invitee. Absent such a duty, there can be no actionable negligence (i.e., tort) on the part of the employees.74 Moreover, “if there is no underlying tort, there can be no basis for the imposition of vicarious liability.”75 Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim for vicarious liability.
Even if he had so alleged, the Court finds no such duty can exist on the facts set forth in the Complaint for two reasons. First, the employees at issue—just like Amazon—had no duty to come to the aid of Plaintiff absent having either a hand in causing the condition which put him peril or a special relationship.76 Again, Plaintiff does not allege facts suggesting this to be the case. Second, Plaintiff does not cite, and the Court cannot find, any Louisiana jurisprudence to support that a private company's internal policies can create a legal duty for an employee to comply with those policies, let alone a case concluding the failure to do so will necessarily constitute negligence. Other district courts, however, have summarily rejected this notion.77
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss78 is GRANTED and Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed WITH PREJUDICE.79
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 29th day of May, 2026.
All Citations
Slip Copy, 2026 WL 1507698
Footnotes omitted
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Ken Kirschenbaum,Esq
Kirschenbaum & Kirschenbaum PC
Attorneys at Law
200 Garden City Plaza
Garden City, NY 11530
516 747 6700 x 301
ken@kirschenbaumesq.com
www.KirschenbaumEsq.com