Supreme Court, Nassau County, New York,
Special Term, Part I.
In the Matter of Philip J. LEVIEN et al., Petitioners,
v.
The BOARD OF ZONING AND APPEALS OF the INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF RUSSELL GARDENS
et al., Resp'ts.
Sept. 4, 1970.
A motion was made to dismiss Article 78 proceeding relating to challenge to
issuance of building permit. The Supreme Court, Special Term, Bernard S. Meyer,
J., held that where village zoning ordinance provided that no building should be
erected or altered until building inspector issued permit certifying that
proposed building or altered building and use complied with ordinance, Board of
Appeals had jurisdiction to pass on determination of building inspector that
commercial building permit complied with zoning ordinance, since zoning
ordinance provision requiring approval of building permit by board of trustees,
which might be reviewable only in Article 78 proceeding, was not applicable to
commercial building.
Motion denied.
West Headnotes
[1] Certiorari 60
73k60 Most Cited Cases
[1] Certiorari 62
73k62 Most Cited Cases
In an Article 78 proceeding, respondent who has objection in point of law has
option of raising it either by motion to dismiss before answer or by setting it
forth in answer, and when he seeks to have court pass upon not only his
objections but also the merits of proceeding as disclosed by pleadings, papers
and admissions, he has but to incorporate objections in his answer and court
will, if it does not dismiss on the basis of objections, consider papers in same
fashion as it would on motion for summary judgment and set matter for trial only
if it concludes that there is a triable issue of fact. CPLR 409(b), 3211(c),
7801 et seq., 7804(a, d, h).
[2] Certiorari 60
73k60 Most Cited Cases
In passing upon motion to dismiss Article 78 proceeding court considered only
petition and exhibits annexed to it and matters which must or might be
judicially noticed where respondents' counsel misconceived applicability of
summary judgment rule to an Article 78 proceeding and placed in supporting
affidavits much of the pleading and evidence which should have gone into answer
and return. CPLR 409(b), 3211(c), 7801 et seq.
[3] Zoning and Planning 441
414k441 Most Cited Cases
Where village zoning ordinance provided that no building should be erected or
altered until building inspector issued permit certifying that proposed building
or altered building and use complied with ordinance, Board of Appeals had
jurisdiction to pass on determination of building inspector that commercial
building permit complied with zoning ordinance, since zoning ordinance provision
requiring approval of building permit by board of trustees, whose decision might
be reviewable only in Article 78 proceeding, was not applicable to commercial
buildings. Village Law § 179-b; CPLR 7801 et seq.
[4] Zoning and Planning 440.1
414k440.1 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 414k440)
Where village zoning ordinance made building inspector's approval of application
or plan a condition precedent to consideration by board of trustees and board
was required to issue permit if satisfied there was a full compliance with
building code, trustees passed on compliance only with the building code which
was wholly separate from zoning ordinance and their having done so did not
relieve Board of Appeals of obligation of reviewing building inspector's
determination that there was compliance with zoning ordinance.
[5] Zoning and Planning 442
414k442 Most Cited Cases
Allegations that petitioners inquired of village clerk for rules of Board of
Appeals fixing time within which to appeal and were told that there were none
and that the failure to file rules precluded board from relying thereon were
sufficient, if proved, to raise question as to whether appeal from issuance of
building permit was timely.
[6] Zoning and Planning 590
414k590 Most Cited Cases
Allegations of petitioners that they owned property immediately abutting
property for which commercial building permit was issued sufficiently pleaded
petitioners' right to maintain proceeding challenging issuance of permit.
Village Law § 179-b; CPLR 7804(f).
**911 *41 Dreyer & Traub, New York City, for petitioners; by Samuel
Kirschenbaum, New York City.
Irving Levine, New York City, for respondents.
MEMORANDUM
BERNARD S. MEYER, Justice.
[1][2] The papers on this motion to dismiss an Article 78 proceeding are
somewhat confused because respondents' counsel has misconceived the
applicability to such a proceeding of CPLR 3211(c) and put into his supporting
affidavits much of the pleading and evidence that should have gone into an
answer and return. An Article 78 proceeding is a special proceeding, CPLR
7804(a), intended to be summarily decided 'upon the pleadings, papers and
admissions to the extent that no triable issues of fact are raised,' CPLR
409(b), and to be tried forthwith if a triable issue is raised, CPLR 7804(h). A
respondent who has an objection in point of law is given the option of raising
it either by motion to dismiss before answer or by setting it forth in his
answer. When he seeks to have the court pass not only upon his objections but
also upon the merits of the proceeding as disclosed by the pleadings, papers and
admissions, he has but to incorporate the objections in his answer, and the
court will if it does not *42 dismiss on the basis of the objetions, then
consider the papers, pursuant to CPLR 409(b), in the same fashion as it would on
a motion for summary judgment, and will set the matter for trial only if it
concludes that there is a triable issue of fact. To hold CPLR 3211(c) applicable
and sanction the procedure here attempted by respondents would be to ignore the
existence of CPLR 409(b) and to deprive petitioners of the right given them by
CPLR 7804(d) to reply to new matter in the answer or dispute the accuracy of the
return. The court will, therefore, in passing upon the motion to dismiss
consider only the petition and exhibits annexed to it and matters which must or
may be judicially noticed.
On the basis of such consideration it is clear that the petition is sufficient,
notwithstanding respondents' contentions that (1) a Board of Appeals has no
jurisdiction to pass upon a permit issued by the Board of Trustees, (2) the
appeal was not timely and (3) petitioners are not persons aggrieved.
**912 [3] On the jurisdiction point respondents rely upon Matter of Katz v.
Board of Appeals, 21 A.D.2d 693, 250 N.Y.S.2d 469, which held that a Village
Board of Trustees is not an 'administrative official' within the meaning of
Village Law s 179--b, and that its act in issuing a permit, though
administrative in nature, could be reviewed only in an Article 78 proceeding.
The record in that case shows that it involved a special exception permit, but
it is not necessary to determine whether that is a sufficient basis to
distinguish the present case, which concerns simply a building permit, for there
is another basis for distinction. The permit issued in the Katz case was issued
by the Trustees pursuant to the Village Zoning Ordinance. In the instant case
Article VI, Section 10 of Ordinance No. 11 (Zoning Ordinance) of the Village of
Russell Gardens provides that 'No building shall be erected or altered * * *
until The Building Inspector shall issue a permit certifying that the proposed
building or the proposed altered building and the use complies in every respect
with this ordinance * * *' (emphasis supplied). While Article III, Section 10
of the Zoning Ordinance requires approval of a building permit by the Board of
Trustees, its provisions are not applicable to a commercial building such as is
the subject of the permit in this case.
[4] Nor is the Board of Appeals deprived of jurisdiction to review the Building
Inspector's determination under Article VI, Section 10 of the Zoning Ordinance
by the provisions of Article I, Section 4 of Ordinance 15 (the Building Code).
In the first place under the latter section of the Building Inspector's approval
of the application or plan is a condition precedent to consideration by *43 the
Board of Trustees and the Building Inspector must sign the permit. More
importantly, subd. 1 of Section 4 makes clear that if 'the Board of Trustees be
satisfied that there is full compliance With the provisions of this Ordinance,
the Board of Trustees Shall promptly Issue a permit therefor' (emphasis
supplied). Thus, the Trustees pass only upon compliance with the Building Code,
an enactment wholly separate from the Zoning Ordinance, see Matter of Rosenstein
v. Curran, 21 A.D.2d 802, 250 N.Y.S.2d 699; Matter of Village of Is. Park v.
Bulk Plants, 258 App.Div. 185, 15 N.Y.S.2d 968; Matter of Cassety (Dobson), 255
App.Div. 928, 8 N.Y.S.2d 740, and their having done so does not relieve the
Board of Appeals of its obligation under Village Law s 179--b of reviewing the
Building Inspector's determination that there was compliance with the Zoning
Ordinance. Paragraph 9 of the Petition pleads that the Building Inspector
(erroneously designated Commissioner) in approving the plans acted contrary to
the authority granted him and, thus, sufficiently raises the point.
[5] The question of timeliness arises because the permit was issued March 17,
1970 and the appeal was filed on May 27, 1970. The petition alleges that the
petitioners inquired of the Village Clerk for Rules of the Board of Appeals
fixing the time to appeal and were told that **913 there were none ( 10, 11)
and that the failure to file Rules precludes respondents reliance upon them (
16). Those allegations are sufficient, if proved, since Village Law s 179--b
requires that every rule of the Board 'shall immediately be filed in the office
of the board and with the Village Clerk and shall be a public record.' Moreover,
the Board's decision, which is annexed as an exhibit to the petition, indicates
that it computed the time to appeal from the issuance of the permit, whereas
Matter of Pansa v. Damiano, 14 N.Y.2d 356, 251 N.Y.S.2d 665, 200 N.E.2d 563 and
Matter of Highway Displays, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 32 A.D.2d 668, 300
N.Y.S.2d 605, hold that the time to appeal of a property owner who has not
received actual notice of the issuance of a permit runs not from the issuance of
the permit but from the time he reasonably became chargeable with notice of its
issuance, provided there has been no element of undue delay or laches.
[6] On the issue of petitioners' standing to appeal, the petition ( 15) alleges
that they own property immediately abutting the property for which the permit
was issued. Whatever the ultimate determination may be on the fact question
whether petitioners' property was adversely affected, that allegation
sufficiently pleads petitioners' right under the sixth unnumbered paragraph of
Village Law s 179--b to maintain the proceeding. Of course, in so ruling the
court does not pass *44 upon whether the Board's finding that petitioners were
not entitled to appeal, because not persons aggrieved within the meaning of the
second unnumbered paragraph of the Section, was supported by substantial
evidence, that not being an issue for consideration on this motion to dismiss.
A short form order has accordingly been signed denying the motion and
directingthat the matter proceed as in CPLR 7804(f) provided. In reaching its
decision the court has not considered the letter of August 7, 1970 from
respondents' counsel or the letter of August 10, 1970 from petitioners' counsel,
both of which were submitted without permission.
313 N.Y.S.2d 909, 64 Misc.2d 40
END OF DOCUMENT
Supreme Court, Nassau County, New York,Special Term, Part I.In the Matter of Philip J. LEVIEN et al., Petitioners,v.The BOARD OF ZONING AND APPEALS OF the INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF RUSSELL GARDENSet al., Resp'ts.
Sept. 4, 1970.
A motion was made to dismiss Article 78 proceeding relating to challenge to issuance of building permit. The Supreme Court, Special Term, Bernard S. Meyer, J., held that where village zoning ordinance provided that no building should be erected or altered until building inspector issued permit certifying that proposed building or altered building and use complied with ordinance, Board of Appeals had jurisdiction to pass on determination of building inspector that commercial building permit complied with zoning ordinance, since zoning ordinance provision requiring approval of building permit by board of trustees, which might be reviewable only in Article 78 proceeding, was not applicable to commercial building.
Motion denied.
West Headnotes
[1] Certiorari 6073k60 Most Cited Cases
[1] Certiorari 6273k62 Most Cited Cases
In an Article 78 proceeding, respondent who has objection in point of law has option of raising it either by motion to dismiss before answer or by setting it forth in answer, and when he seeks to have court pass upon not only his objections but also the merits of proceeding as disclosed by pleadings, papers and admissions, he has but to incorporate objections in his answer and court will, if it does not dismiss on the basis of objections, consider papers in same fashion as it would on motion for summary judgment and set matter for trial only if it concludes that there is a triable issue of fact. CPLR 409(b), 3211(c), 7801 et seq., 7804(a, d, h).
[2] Certiorari 6073k60 Most Cited Cases
In passing upon motion to dismiss Article 78 proceeding court considered only petition and exhibits annexed to it and matters which must or might be judicially noticed where respondents' counsel misconceived applicability of summary judgment rule to an Article 78 proceeding and placed in supporting affidavits much of the pleading and evidence which should have gone into answer and return. CPLR 409(b), 3211(c), 7801 et seq.
[3] Zoning and Planning 441414k441 Most Cited Cases
Where village zoning ordinance provided that no building should be erected or altered until building inspector issued permit certifying that proposed building or altered building and use complied with ordinance, Board of Appeals had jurisdiction to pass on determination of building inspector that commercial building permit complied with zoning ordinance, since zoning ordinance provision requiring approval of building permit by board of trustees, whose decision might be reviewable only in Article 78 proceeding, was not applicable to commercial buildings. Village Law § 179-b; CPLR 7801 et seq.
[4] Zoning and Planning 440.1414k440.1 Most Cited Cases (Formerly 414k440)
Where village zoning ordinance made building inspector's approval of application or plan a condition precedent to consideration by board of trustees and board was required to issue permit if satisfied there was a full compliance with building code, trustees passed on compliance only with the building code which was wholly separate from zoning ordinance and their having done so did not relieve Board of Appeals of obligation of reviewing building inspector's determination that there was compliance with zoning ordinance.
[5] Zoning and Planning 442414k442 Most Cited Cases
Allegations that petitioners inquired of village clerk for rules of Board of Appeals fixing time within which to appeal and were told that there were none and that the failure to file rules precluded board from relying thereon were sufficient, if proved, to raise question as to whether appeal from issuance of building permit was timely.
[6] Zoning and Planning 590414k590 Most Cited Cases
Allegations of petitioners that they owned property immediately abutting property for which commercial building permit was issued sufficiently pleaded petitioners' right to maintain proceeding challenging issuance of permit. Village Law § 179-b; CPLR 7804(f). **911 *41 Dreyer & Traub, New York City, for petitioners; by Samuel Kirschenbaum, New York City.
Irving Levine, New York City, for respondents.
MEMORANDUM
BERNARD S. MEYER, Justice.
[1][2] The papers on this motion to dismiss an Article 78 proceeding are somewhat confused because respondents' counsel has misconceived the applicability to such a proceeding of CPLR 3211(c) and put into his supporting affidavits much of the pleading and evidence that should have gone into an answer and return. An Article 78 proceeding is a special proceeding, CPLR 7804(a), intended to be summarily decided 'upon the pleadings, papers and admissions to the extent that no triable issues of fact are raised,' CPLR 409(b), and to be tried forthwith if a triable issue is raised, CPLR 7804(h). A respondent who has an objection in point of law is given the option of raising it either by motion to dismiss before answer or by setting it forth in his answer. When he seeks to have the court pass not only upon his objections but also upon the merits of the proceeding as disclosed by the pleadings, papers and admissions, he has but to incorporate the objections in his answer, and the court will if it does not *42 dismiss on the basis of the objetions, then consider the papers, pursuant to CPLR 409(b), in the same fashion as it would on a motion for summary judgment, and will set the matter for trial only if it concludes that there is a triable issue of fact. To hold CPLR 3211(c) applicable and sanction the procedure here attempted by respondents would be to ignore the existence of CPLR 409(b) and to deprive petitioners of the right given them by CPLR 7804(d) to reply to new matter in the answer or dispute the accuracy of the return. The court will, therefore, in passing upon the motion to dismiss consider only the petition and exhibits annexed to it and matters which must or may be judicially noticed.
On the basis of such consideration it is clear that the petition is sufficient, notwithstanding respondents' contentions that (1) a Board of Appeals has no jurisdiction to pass upon a permit issued by the Board of Trustees, (2) the appeal was not timely and (3) petitioners are not persons aggrieved.
**912 [3] On the jurisdiction point respondents rely upon Matter of Katz v. Board of Appeals, 21 A.D.2d 693, 250 N.Y.S.2d 469, which held that a Village Board of Trustees is not an 'administrative official' within the meaning of Village Law s 179--b, and that its act in issuing a permit, though administrative in nature, could be reviewed only in an Article 78 proceeding. The record in that case shows that it involved a special exception permit, but it is not necessary to determine whether that is a sufficient basis to distinguish the present case, which concerns simply a building permit, for there is another basis for distinction. The permit issued in the Katz case was issued by the Trustees pursuant to the Village Zoning Ordinance. In the instant case Article VI, Section 10 of Ordinance No. 11 (Zoning Ordinance) of the Village of Russell Gardens provides that 'No building shall be erected or altered * * * until The Building Inspector shall issue a permit certifying that the proposed building or the proposed altered building and the use complies in every respect with this ordinance * * *' (emphasis supplied). While Article III, Section 10 of the Zoning Ordinance requires approval of a building permit by the Board of Trustees, its provisions are not applicable to a commercial building such as is the subject of the permit in this case.
[4] Nor is the Board of Appeals deprived of jurisdiction to review the Building Inspector's determination under Article VI, Section 10 of the Zoning Ordinance by the provisions of Article I, Section 4 of Ordinance 15 (the Building Code). In the first place under the latter section of the Building Inspector's approval of the application or plan is a condition precedent to consideration by *43 the Board of Trustees and the Building Inspector must sign the permit. More importantly, subd. 1 of Section 4 makes clear that if 'the Board of Trustees be satisfied that there is full compliance With the provisions of this Ordinance, the Board of Trustees Shall promptly Issue a permit therefor' (emphasis supplied). Thus, the Trustees pass only upon compliance with the Building Code, an enactment wholly separate from the Zoning Ordinance, see Matter of Rosenstein v. Curran, 21 A.D.2d 802, 250 N.Y.S.2d 699; Matter of Village of Is. Park v. Bulk Plants, 258 App.Div. 185, 15 N.Y.S.2d 968; Matter of Cassety (Dobson), 255 App.Div. 928, 8 N.Y.S.2d 740, and their having done so does not relieve the Board of Appeals of its obligation under Village Law s 179--b of reviewing the Building Inspector's determination that there was compliance with the Zoning Ordinance. Paragraph 9 of the Petition pleads that the Building Inspector (erroneously designated Commissioner) in approving the plans acted contrary to the authority granted him and, thus, sufficiently raises the point.
[5] The question of timeliness arises because the permit was issued March 17, 1970 and the appeal was filed on May 27, 1970. The petition alleges that the petitioners inquired of the Village Clerk for Rules of the Board of Appeals fixing the time to appeal and were told that **913 there were none ( 10, 11) and that the failure to file Rules precludes respondents reliance upon them ( 16). Those allegations are sufficient, if proved, since Village Law s 179--b requires that every rule of the Board 'shall immediately be filed in the office of the board and with the Village Clerk and shall be a public record.' Moreover, the Board's decision, which is annexed as an exhibit to the petition, indicates that it computed the time to appeal from the issuance of the permit, whereas Matter of Pansa v. Damiano, 14 N.Y.2d 356, 251 N.Y.S.2d 665, 200 N.E.2d 563 and Matter of Highway Displays, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 32 A.D.2d 668, 300 N.Y.S.2d 605, hold that the time to appeal of a property owner who has not received actual notice of the issuance of a permit runs not from the issuance of the permit but from the time he reasonably became chargeable with notice of its issuance, provided there has been no element of undue delay or laches.
[6] On the issue of petitioners' standing to appeal, the petition ( 15) alleges that they own property immediately abutting the property for which the permit was issued. Whatever the ultimate determination may be on the fact question whether petitioners' property was adversely affected, that allegation sufficiently pleads petitioners' right under the sixth unnumbered paragraph of Village Law s 179--b to maintain the proceeding. Of course, in so ruling the court does not pass *44 upon whether the Board's finding that petitioners were not entitled to appeal, because not persons aggrieved within the meaning of the second unnumbered paragraph of the Section, was supported by substantial evidence, that not being an issue for consideration on this motion to dismiss.
A short form order has accordingly been signed denying the motion and directingthat the matter proceed as in CPLR 7804(f) provided. In reaching its decision the court has not considered the letter of August 7, 1970 from respondents' counsel or the letter of August 10, 1970 from petitioners' counsel, both of which were submitted without permission.
313 N.Y.S.2d 909, 64 Misc.2d 40
END OF DOCUMENT