Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.
Robert GROSVENOR, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
NIEMAND BROTHERS, et al., Defendants third-party Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Bell Security Inc., third-party Defendant-Respondent.
April 10, 1989.
 Security guard brought suit against property owners for injury he sustained on 
their premises.   Property owners brought third-party claims against guard's 
employer.   The Supreme Court, Kings County, Held, J., granted employer's motion 
for summary judgment and severed third-party action from main action, and 
property owners appealed.   The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that:  
(1) submission of affidavit by attorney for property owners was insufficient as 
matter of law to defeat employer's summary judgment motion, but (2) affidavit by 
office manager for employer was sufficient to warrant granting of summary 
judgment in employer's favor.
 Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Judgment  185.1(3)
228k185.1(3) Most Cited Cases
Affirmation of counsel who has no personal knowledge of the facts is 
insufficient as matter of law to raise any triable issues of fact.
[2] Judgment  185.1(3)
228k185.1(3) Most Cited Cases
[2] Judgment  186
228k186 Most Cited Cases
Submission of affirmation by counsel for property owners, who were being sued 
for their security guard's injury, was insufficient as matter of law to defeat 
motion for summary judgment by guard's employer on owners' third-party claims 
for indemnity and contribution;  although discovery proceedings had not yet been 
completed at time employer moved for summary judgment, property owners should 
have been able to come forth with some evidentiary basis for those claims.
[3] Judgment  185.1(3)
228k185.1(3) Most Cited Cases
[3] Judgment  185.3(8)
228k185.3(8) Most Cited Cases
Affidavit of office manager for security guard's employer, which was defending 
third-party claims by property owners being sued for security guard's injury, 
was sufficient to warrant granting of summary judgment in employer's favor, 
since office manager had first-hand knowledge of employer's business practices 
and procedures, and affidavit raised prima facie defense to third-party claims.
 **794 William A. Prinsell, New York City (Donald Malone of counsel), for 
defendants third-party plaintiffs-appellants.
 Kirschenbaum & Kirschenbaum, P.C., Garden City (Kenneth Kirschenbaum of 
counsel), for third-party defendant-respondent.
 Before MOLLEN, P.J., and MANGANO, BROWN and HARWOOD, JJ.
 MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.
 *459 In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the 
defendants third-party plaintiffs appeal (1) from an order of the Supreme Court, 
Kings County (Held, J.), dated April 25, 1988, which granted the motion of the 
third-party defendant Bell Security Inc. for summary judgment dismissing the 
third-party complaint, and (2) from an order of the same court dated May 27, 
1988, which severed the third-party action from the main action.
 ORDERED that the orders are affirmed, with one bill of costs.
 The plaintiffs commenced the instant action in January 1987, inter alia, to 
recover damages for personal injuries, etc., which the plaintiff Robert 
Grosvenor sustained when he fell off a ladder while replacing a light bulb in a 
fixture located on the defendants' premises.   The plaintiff Robert Grosvenor, 
an employee of the third-party defendant Bell Security, Inc. (hereinafter Bell), 
a security company, was assigned as a security guard for the defendants' 
premises on the day of the accident.   Following service of the plaintiffs' 
complaint, the defendants served a third-party complaint upon Bell which 
contained three causes of action, namely, common-law indemnity, contribution and 
contractual indemnity.
 Following joinder of issue in the third-party action and service of the bills 
of particulars, Bell moved for summary judgment dismissing the third-party 
complaint.   In support of its motion, Bell submitted an affidavit of its office 
manager, Gail Cohen, in which she explained that there was no written agreement 
between Bell and the appellants for the performance of Bell's security services, 
but rather there existed an understanding between the parties whereby Bell 
agreed to provide security guards who would perform surveillance services at the 
appellants' premises.   Ms. Cohen asserted that "there was absolutely no 
agreement, written or implied, that Bell would indemnify [appellants] under any 
circumstances".   With regard to the appellants' cause of action for 
contribution, Cohen noted that the appellants' allegations in support thereof 
were merely conclusory and devoid of facts.   In any *460 event, Cohen asserted 
that the cause of action was without merit since, according to the bills of 
particulars, the plaintiff Robert Grosvenor's accident occurred approximately 35 
minutes before the start of his shift as a security guard.  Additionally, it was 
established that the plaintiff's duties as a security guard did not include the 
performance of maintenance work.   In view thereof, Bell maintained that the 
appellants' causes of action for contribution as well as indemnification should 
be dismissed.
 In opposition to Bell's motion, the appellants' attorney submitted an 
affirmation in which he essentially took the position that Bell's motion was 
premature since discovery had not been completed.   The appellants' counsel also 
maintained that Bell's office manager was not a proper party to submit an 
affidavit in support of the summary judgment motion since she did have firsthand 
knowledge of the facts.
 The Supreme Court granted Bell's motion for summary judgment dismissing the 
**795 third-party complaint stating, inter alia, "[t]he motion is granted 
because the only opposition is by an attorney without actual knowledge of the 
facts".   In a subsequent order, the Supreme Court severed the third-party 
action from the plaintiffs' action.   We now affirm.
 [1][2] It is well established that in order to defeat a motion for summary 
judgment, a party must come forward with evidentiary proof in admissible form 
sufficient to raise triable issues of fact (see, Alvord & Swift v. Muller 
Constr. Co., 46 N.Y.2d 276, 413 N.Y.S.2d 309, 385 N.E.2d 1238;  Capelin Assoc. 
v. Globe Mfg. Corp., 34 N.Y.2d 338, 342, 357 N.Y.S.2d 478, 313 N.E.2d 776;  
Rotuba Extruders v. Ceppos, 46 N.Y.2d 223, 231, 413 N.Y.S.2d 141, 385 N.E.2d 
1068).   Moreover, an affirmation of counsel who has no personal knowledge of 
the facts, is insufficient, as a matter of law, to raise any triable issues of 
fact (see, Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595, 404 
N.E.2d 718;  Dicupe v. City of New York, 124 A.D.2d 542, 543, 507 N.Y.S.2d 687).   
Accordingly, in the case at bar, the appellants' submission of their counsel's 
affirmation in opposition to Bell's motion, was insufficient, as a matter of 
law, to defeat the summary judgment motion.  Moreover, although discovery 
proceedings had not yet been completed at the time Bell moved for summary 
judgment, the appellants, who were asserting claims, inter alia, of common-law 
and contractual indemnification, should have been able to come forth with some 
evidentiary basis for those claims. Similarly, the appellants failed to 
adequately demonstrate what facts they sought to obtain during the discovery 
proceedings which would raise triable issues of fact as to the third-party 
complaint and what reasonable steps were taken during *461 the period of more 
than one year between joinder of issue and Bell's summary judgment motion, to 
obtain discovery.
 [3] Contrary to the appellants' contention, Cohen's affidavit was sufficient to 
warrant the granting of summary judgment in Bell's favor since Cohen, as Bell's 
office manager, had first-hand knowledge of Bell's business practices and 
procedures, and her affidavit raised a prima facie defense to the third-party 
complaint.
539 N.Y.S.2d 793, 149 A.D.2d 459
END OF DOCUMENT

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Robert GROSVENOR, et al., Plaintiffs,v.NIEMAND BROTHERS, et al., Defendants third-party Plaintiffs-Appellants,Bell Security Inc., third-party Defendant-Respondent.

April 10, 1989.

 Security guard brought suit against property owners for injury he sustained on their premises.   Property owners brought third-party claims against guard's employer.   The Supreme Court, Kings County, Held, J., granted employer's motion for summary judgment and severed third-party action from main action, and property owners appealed.   The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that:  (1) submission of affidavit by attorney for property owners was insufficient as matter of law to defeat employer's summary judgment motion, but (2) affidavit by office manager for employer was sufficient to warrant granting of summary judgment in employer's favor.
 Affirmed.

West Headnotes
[1] Judgment  185.1(3)228k185.1(3) Most Cited Cases
Affirmation of counsel who has no personal knowledge of the facts is insufficient as matter of law to raise any triable issues of fact.
[2] Judgment  185.1(3)228k185.1(3) Most Cited Cases
[2] Judgment  186228k186 Most Cited Cases
Submission of affirmation by counsel for property owners, who were being sued for their security guard's injury, was insufficient as matter of law to defeat motion for summary judgment by guard's employer on owners' third-party claims for indemnity and contribution;  although discovery proceedings had not yet been completed at time employer moved for summary judgment, property owners should have been able to come forth with some evidentiary basis for those claims.
[3] Judgment  185.1(3)228k185.1(3) Most Cited Cases
[3] Judgment  185.3(8)228k185.3(8) Most Cited Cases
Affidavit of office manager for security guard's employer, which was defending third-party claims by property owners being sued for security guard's injury, was sufficient to warrant granting of summary judgment in employer's favor, since office manager had first-hand knowledge of employer's business practices and procedures, and affidavit raised prima facie defense to third-party claims. **794 William A. Prinsell, New York City (Donald Malone of counsel), for defendants third-party plaintiffs-appellants.
 Kirschenbaum & Kirschenbaum, P.C., Garden City (Kenneth Kirschenbaum of counsel), for third-party defendant-respondent.

 Before MOLLEN, P.J., and MANGANO, BROWN and HARWOOD, JJ.


 MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.
 *459 In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants third-party plaintiffs appeal (1) from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Held, J.), dated April 25, 1988, which granted the motion of the third-party defendant Bell Security Inc. for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint, and (2) from an order of the same court dated May 27, 1988, which severed the third-party action from the main action.
 ORDERED that the orders are affirmed, with one bill of costs.
 The plaintiffs commenced the instant action in January 1987, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., which the plaintiff Robert Grosvenor sustained when he fell off a ladder while replacing a light bulb in a fixture located on the defendants' premises.   The plaintiff Robert Grosvenor, an employee of the third-party defendant Bell Security, Inc. (hereinafter Bell), a security company, was assigned as a security guard for the defendants' premises on the day of the accident.   Following service of the plaintiffs' complaint, the defendants served a third-party complaint upon Bell which contained three causes of action, namely, common-law indemnity, contribution and contractual indemnity.
 Following joinder of issue in the third-party action and service of the bills of particulars, Bell moved for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint.   In support of its motion, Bell submitted an affidavit of its office manager, Gail Cohen, in which she explained that there was no written agreement between Bell and the appellants for the performance of Bell's security services, but rather there existed an understanding between the parties whereby Bell agreed to provide security guards who would perform surveillance services at the appellants' premises.   Ms. Cohen asserted that "there was absolutely no agreement, written or implied, that Bell would indemnify [appellants] under any circumstances".   With regard to the appellants' cause of action for contribution, Cohen noted that the appellants' allegations in support thereof were merely conclusory and devoid of facts.   In any *460 event, Cohen asserted that the cause of action was without merit since, according to the bills of particulars, the plaintiff Robert Grosvenor's accident occurred approximately 35 minutes before the start of his shift as a security guard.  Additionally, it was established that the plaintiff's duties as a security guard did not include the performance of maintenance work.   In view thereof, Bell maintained that the appellants' causes of action for contribution as well as indemnification should be dismissed.
 In opposition to Bell's motion, the appellants' attorney submitted an affirmation in which he essentially took the position that Bell's motion was premature since discovery had not been completed.   The appellants' counsel also maintained that Bell's office manager was not a proper party to submit an affidavit in support of the summary judgment motion since she did have firsthand knowledge of the facts.
 The Supreme Court granted Bell's motion for summary judgment dismissing the **795 third-party complaint stating, inter alia, "[t]he motion is granted because the only opposition is by an attorney without actual knowledge of the facts".   In a subsequent order, the Supreme Court severed the third-party action from the plaintiffs' action.   We now affirm.
 [1][2] It is well established that in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, a party must come forward with evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to raise triable issues of fact (see, Alvord & Swift v. Muller Constr. Co., 46 N.Y.2d 276, 413 N.Y.S.2d 309, 385 N.E.2d 1238;  Capelin Assoc. v. Globe Mfg. Corp., 34 N.Y.2d 338, 342, 357 N.Y.S.2d 478, 313 N.E.2d 776;  Rotuba Extruders v. Ceppos, 46 N.Y.2d 223, 231, 413 N.Y.S.2d 141, 385 N.E.2d 1068).   Moreover, an affirmation of counsel who has no personal knowledge of the facts, is insufficient, as a matter of law, to raise any triable issues of fact (see, Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595, 404 N.E.2d 718;  Dicupe v. City of New York, 124 A.D.2d 542, 543, 507 N.Y.S.2d 687).   Accordingly, in the case at bar, the appellants' submission of their counsel's affirmation in opposition to Bell's motion, was insufficient, as a matter of law, to defeat the summary judgment motion.  Moreover, although discovery proceedings had not yet been completed at the time Bell moved for summary judgment, the appellants, who were asserting claims, inter alia, of common-law and contractual indemnification, should have been able to come forth with some evidentiary basis for those claims. Similarly, the appellants failed to adequately demonstrate what facts they sought to obtain during the discovery proceedings which would raise triable issues of fact as to the third-party complaint and what reasonable steps were taken during *461 the period of more than one year between joinder of issue and Bell's summary judgment motion, to obtain discovery.
 [3] Contrary to the appellants' contention, Cohen's affidavit was sufficient to warrant the granting of summary judgment in Bell's favor since Cohen, as Bell's office manager, had first-hand knowledge of Bell's business practices and procedures, and her affidavit raised a prima facie defense to the third-party complaint.
539 N.Y.S.2d 793, 149 A.D.2d 459
END OF DOCUMENT