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196 Misc.2d 922,
768 N.Y.S.2d 759, 2003 N.Y. Slip Op. 23655 View New York Official Reports version Homeowners brought action for fraud, negligence, and breach of warranty in connection with the installation and operation of an alarm system against security system company. On company's motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court, Nassau County, Winslow, J., held that: (1) alleged false representations by company's representative were sufficient to support claim for fraud; (2) representative of company had an affirmative duty, apart from duties imposed under contract, to tell homeowners that security system would not operate if the telephone lines were cut; (3) disclaimers in contract did not preclude homeowners from going forward with proof of fraud; (4) exculpatory clauses in contract precluded claims based on ordinary negligence; (5) losses resulting from deactivation of security system were not purely economic as a matter of law; and (6) clauses in contracts limiting company's liability under any circumstances to $250 were unenforceable against claims of gross negligence or intentional misconduct. Motion granted in part, denied in part. [1] KeyCite Notes In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the facts alleged as true and accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference. McKinney's CPLR 3211. [2] KeyCite Notes In ruling upon a motion to dismiss the Court may not address the merits of the complaint or any of its factual allegations, but must determine only whether the alleged facts fit within any cognizable legal theory. McKinney's CPLR 3211. [3] KeyCite Notes (Formerly 307Ak622) Dismissal is warranted only if the documentary evidence conclusively establishes a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law; the criterion is whether the proponent of a pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one. McKinney's CPLR 3211. [4] KeyCite Notes To establish a prima facie case of fraud, the plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant made a material representation of fact that was false; (2) the defendant knew that the representation was false and made it with intent to deceive (scienter); (3) the plaintiff justifiably relied upon defendant's misrepresentation; and (4) the plaintiff suffered some loss or harm as a result of such reliance. [5] KeyCite Notes Rule providing that, in an action for fraud, "the circumstances constituting the wrong shall be stated in detail," requires only that the misconduct complained of be set forth in sufficient detail to clearly inform a defendant with respect to the incidents complained of and is not to be interpreted so strictly as to prevent an otherwise valid cause of action in situations where it may be impossible to state in detail the circumstances constituting a fraud. McKinney's CPLR 3016(b). [6] KeyCite Notes (Formerly 372k463) Alleged representation by security company representative that home security system would transmit an alarm signal to the central monitoring station even if the telephone lines were cut was sufficient to support a claim for fraud brought by homeowners against security company, given that security company's moving papers conceded that the system was not designed to work in such circumstance. McKinney's CPLR 3016(b). [7] KeyCite Notes To maintain a fraud action in a contractual setting, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a legal duty separate and apart from the contractual duty to perform; (2) a fraudulent representation collateral or extraneous to the contract; or (3) special damages proximately caused by the fraudulent representation that are not recoverable under the contract measure of damages. [8] KeyCite Notes (Formerly 372k463) Representative of security system company had an affirmative duty, apart from duties imposed under contract, to tell homeowners that security system would not operate if the telephone lines were cut, supporting homeowner's cause of action for fraud based on the allegation that representative stated that the system would operate if the telephone lines were cut; security system company had superior knowledge regarding the capabilities of its own alarm system, which knowledge was unavailable to homeowners through ordinary inspection, and which was material to the homeowners' decision to enter into the contracts with company or to forego alternatives that might have provided more effective or complete protection. [9] KeyCite Notes A seller with superior knowledge has a duty to disclose facts, not available to the purchaser, that would affect the purchaser's conduct in the transaction; the duty to disclose arises where nondisclosure would lead the person to whom it was or should have been made to forego action that might otherwise have been taken for the protection of that person. [10] KeyCite Notes A fraud action is not precluded by virtue of its being interposed in a contractual setting, given that a distinct legal duty exists, apart from performance under the contract. [11] KeyCite Notes The parol evidence rule and general merger clauses exclude extrinsic evidence to contradict or vary the terms of a written instrument in the context of a suit to enforce an oral representation; both are ineffectual to exclude evidence of fraudulent representations in an action to rescind a contract or to recover loss sustained as a result of fraudulent inducement. McKinney's General Obligations Law § 15-301. [12] KeyCite Notes In the limited context of consumer sales transaction, if allegations in a plaintiff's claims state with particularity the oral representations relied upon, together with contextual facts, in sufficient detail to permit the court to gauge their inherent credibility, the plaintiff should be permitted to go forward with his proof, notwithstanding the existence of a specific disclaimer in the contract form. [13] KeyCite Notes (Formerly 372k463) Homeowners would be permitted to go forward with proof of fraud in the inducement of consumer sales transaction with home security company based on alleged representations by made by company representative stating that security system would transmit an alarm signal even if telephone lines were cut, notwithstanding the existence of a specific disclaimer of reliance contained in the contract form; to reflexively disallow parol evidence on the basis of such disclaimer, would be to reward the ingenuity of draftsmen at the expense of sound public policy, and to invite sales agents, armed with impenetrable contracts, to lie to their customers. [14] KeyCite Notes (Formerly 372k463) Language in security system agreement disclaiming liability for losses arising from "interruption of service due to telephone line failure" or the failure of any public or private carrier service which prevents the signals from reaching monitoring center did not negate homeowners' justifiable reliance, as a matter of law, upon company representative's alleged contrary statements that security system would transmit an alarm signal even if telephone lines were cut, given that the agreement did not clarify how the system could be compromised or circumvented. [15] KeyCite Notes Whereas an exculpatory clause is enforceable against claims of ordinary negligence, such clauses are unenforceable with respect to claims of reckless or intentional conduct, as a matter of public policy. [16] KeyCite Notes (Formerly 372k463) Exculpatory clauses in contract for security system expressly disclaiming liability resulting from security company's negligent performance or failure to perform under the contract precluded claims brought by homeowners against security company based on ordinary negligence. [17] KeyCite Notes (Formerly 372k463) Safety-insurance policy of tort law was applicable to negligence claim brought by homeowners against security system company, and thus losses resulting from deactivation of security system by burglar who cut telephone wires were not purely economic as a matter of law; the harm to homeowner was not just that the security system failed to perform as intended, but that the security of the home and the safety of its occupants were compromised. [18] KeyCite Notes (Formerly 372k463) A burglar alarm system installed in a person's home, which is easily deactivated by a simple, well-known technique, may be considered an inherently dangerous product, requiring, at minimum, a full and clear disclosure to the homeowner of the system's limitations. [19] KeyCite Notes (Formerly 372k463) Clauses in contracts for home security system, limiting company's liability under any circumstances to $250, were unenforceable against claims of gross negligence or intentional misconduct brought by homeowners whose home was burglarized after the telephone lines were cut. **761 *923 Krohn, Rosenblum, Hametz, Waldman & Watters, LLP (Ivan Hametz of counsel), for defendant. Perez, Furey & Varvaro (Joseph Varvaro of counsel), for plaintiffs. *924 F. DANA WINSLOW, Justice. Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR § 3211 is determined as follows. This is an action for fraud, negligence and breach of warranty in connection with the installation and operation of an alarm system by SLOMIN'S INC. ("SLOMIN'S") in the home of plaintiffs VINCENZO and CONCETTA CIRILLO. The SLOMIN'S system purchased by plaintiffs provided for central station monitoring, which contemplated the transmission of a signal from the alarm system via the telephone lines in the event of a break-in. On or about June 27, 1998, plaintiff **762 VINCENZO CIRILLO entered into four written contracts with SLOMIN'S: the Retail Installment Agreement (the "Installment Agreement"); Central Station Five-Year Monitoring Agreement (the "Monitoring Agreement"); Security System Service Plan (the "Service Plan"); and Addendum for Slomin's Wireless Key FOB System (the "Addendum", collectively, the "Contracts"). Plaintiffs allege that, in purchasing the alarm system and entering into the Contracts, they relied on the following representations made by SLOMIN'S sales agent Howard S. Goldberg ("Goldberg") and/or contained in the written promotional materials provided to plaintiffs prior to the execution of the Contracts: • That plaintiffs were purchasing a "top of the line" alarm system, guaranteed to keep their home safe from intruders. • That the said alarm system was "hooked" into a central monitoring station operated and maintained by defendant and that, in the event of intrusion, the alarm system would "go off" automatically. • That response time, in the event of an emergency, would be less than five minutes. • That the system was fail safe in that, if the phone wires in the junction box were cut, the alarm would automatically "trip," alerting the central monitoring station and the police would respond within minutes. • That, to Goldberg's "knowledge," in the three years immediately preceding the installation of the said alarm system at Plaintiffs' home, there had not been any successful burglaries of homes that had a similar system installed by Defendant. • *925 That the defendant, its employees, agents and servants, were experts in the installation, maintenance and operation of central station alarm systems, and that they were the "best" on Long Island, if not in the State of New York, in the installation, maintenance and operation of such stations. On January 6, 2002, the plaintiffs' home was burglarized, at which time the home telephone lines were cut. Plaintiffs maintain that either the alarm system failed to transmit a signal or defendant's central monitoring agents failed to appreciate it. In either event, plaintiffs assert, the police were not notified until plaintiffs returned home and called them from a neighbor's telephone. Plaintiffs allege that they sustained substantial loss as a result of the burglary and the failure of SLOMIN'S to timely notify the police. Plaintiffs commenced this action in April 2002, asserting claims of fraud, negligence and breach of warranty. Defendant now moves to dismiss pursuant to CPLR(a)(1) and (7) on the ground that all causes of action are barred by the express terms of the Contracts. In particular, defendant refers to the merger clauses, disclaimers of representations and warranties, exculpatory clauses and limitation of liability or liquidated damages clauses contained the Contracts. [1] Courts generally refrain from disturbing arms-length transactions, and where the language of a contract is unambiguous, it is generally enforced according to its terms. Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Datamax Corp., 274 A.D.2d 386, 710 N.Y.S.2d 613. The Contracts at issue here articulate an unambiguous intent to negate or limit *926 Slomin's liability in almost every circumstance, and, on their face, present a defense to plaintiff's claims. However, New York courts have long recognized certain circumstances, including but not limited to fraud, in which even the most flawlessly drafted contract provisions may be subject to judicial scrutiny, and even avoided, in the interest of justice or sound public policy. The question is whether such circumstances exist here. I. FRAUD/MISREPRESENTATION. [4] [5] [6] Defendant also argues that plaintiffs are barred from asserting a fraud claim because the only fraud alleged relates to a breach of contract. See Page v. Muze, Inc., 270 A.D.2d 401, 705 N.Y.S.2d 383. The Court of Appeals has held that: "[A] simple breach of contract is not to be considered a tort unless a legal duty independent of the contract itself has been violated. This legal duty must spring from circumstances extraneous to, and not constituting elements of, the contract, although it may be connected with and dependent upon the contract." Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island Rail Road Co., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 516 N.E.2d 190 (citations omitted). [7] FN1. In its memorandum of law, SLOMIN'S incorrectly cites Bell Sports, supra, as holding that all three criteria must be satisfied in order to maintain a fraud action. The Court has reviewed the case and notes that the requirements are stated in the disjunctive, meaning that satisfaction of any one of them is sufficient to sustain the action. [8] [9] [10] Defendant next argues that plaintiffs have effectively extinguished their fraud claim by continuing to subscribe to SLOMIN'S alarm plan as well as its heating and air conditioning plans. However, ratification of a transaction after discovery of a fraud may extinguish a right to rescission, but it does not extinguish a claim for monetary compensation for injuries resulting from the fraud. Clearview Concrete Products Corp. v. Gherardi, Inc., 88 A.D.2d 461, 453 N.Y.S.2d 750. Although in some circumstances, ratification will undercut a plaintiff's claim of reliance [see Id.; Champion Titanium Horseshoe, Inc. v. Wyman-Gordon Investment Castings, Inc., 925 F.Supp. 188], in this case, the fact that plaintiffs continue to do business with SLOMIN'S does not necessarily negate the claim that plaintiffs relied upon certain representations in choosing to do business with them initially. Plaintiffs may show that upon learning the true nature of the system, they chose to continue with SLOMIN'S out of economic or practical expedience, and/or they found other means to supplement their protection. That is not to say that they would have chosen SLOMIN'S in the first instance, had they known that the system could be easily deactivated. The Court determines that, in this case, reliance is not defeated by ratification, as a matter of law, but that plaintiffs have the burden to prove reliance in the context of such ratification. The Court turns to the Contract provisions that purport to bar liability. Each Contract contains a provision substantially as follows: **766 FULL AGREEMENT; SEVERABILITY. This agreement constitutes the full understanding of the parties and there are no oral Agreements, understandings *930 or representations between the parties. This Agreement may not be amended or modified except in writing signed by both parties. Should any provision of this Agreement be deemed void, the remaining parts shall not be affected. [11] Defendant further argues that the Contracts contain specific disclaimers that do not fall within the rule articulated in Sabo v. Delman, supra, and that, consequently, defeat plaintiffs' claim. The Sabo rule, that fraud in the inducement vitiates a contract, is subject to exception. If a "plaintiff has, in the plainest language announced and stipulated that it is not relying on any representations as to the very matter as to which it now claims it was defrauded[, s]uch a specific disclaimer destroys the allegations in plaintiff's complaint that the agreement was executed in reliance upon these contrary representations." Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 5 N.Y.2d 317, 320, 184 N.Y.S.2d 599, 157 N.E.2d 597. See also Citibank, N.A. v. Plapinger, |